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CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND THE MEDIAEVAL THEORY OF PREACHING¹

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AMONG the sculptures on the *portail royal* of Chartres Cathedral, that mediaeval *summa* of chiseled stone, one may see the seven liberal arts personified in female forms. And under these one may perceive the outstanding representatives of all the arts. There, symbolized in its place in mediaeval life is rhetoric, and at her feet is Cicero. From Carolingian times well into the Renaissance, rhetoric as one of the liberal arts was figured in church sculptures, murals, mosaics, manuscript miniatures, the ornamentation of library rooms, fountains, table-tops, bronze vessels, windows, tapestry, altars, and gravestones; in one form or another at Auxerre, Bourges, Clermont, Laon, Rheims, Rouen, St. Omer, Sens, Soissons, Freiburg Münster, the Abbey of St. Gall, Rimini, Florence, Siena, the Vatican; the handiwork in the earlier period most often of unknown artists, but later also of Giotto, the brothers Pisani, Pollaiuolo, Botticelli, Melozzo da Forlì, Pinturricchio, and Raphael.² Cicero is almost always her attendant, and she appears with attributes that vary with the imagination of the artist. At times she holds a pose perhaps intended to be faithful to Capella's striking portrait³ of the omnipotent queen, a woman of sub-

¹ Part of this paper was read before the Classical Association of England and Wales at Cardiff on April 9, 1929.

² Karl Künstle's *Ikongraphie der christlichen Kunst* (Freiburg in B., 1928) supplies most of the information at present available in this field. See his Bibliography, pp. 145 ff., and also W. Molsdorf, *Christliche Symbolik der mittelalterlichen Kunst* (Leipzig, 1926).

³ *De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii*, sec. 426; ed. Dick (Leipzig, 1925), p. 211.

lime and radiant beauty and regal poise, helmeted, and bearing her flashing weapons in her hands; her robe, girt about her shoulders in the Latin way, embroidered with a multitude of figures, and her breast bejeweled in most exquisite colors. Thus she appears with a sword and shield; or, again, she makes an oratorical gesture, or carries a scroll, a tablet and stilus, or a golden nugget. The motive was persistent in the fine art of the period.

This prominence of rhetoric in art is a reflection of her importance in literature. Almost consistently throughout the Middle Ages—from the works of Capella to those of Vincent of Beauvais, from the fifth century to the thirteenth and beyond—rhetoric as one of the liberal arts played a significant part in mediaeval life. The classical rhetoric survived in many forms. In the first place, manuscripts of some of the chief classical authors themselves were plentiful in European libraries. Secondly, there were the works of the minor rhetoricians⁴ of later date, who, following the relatively compendious fashion of an isagogic work or encyclopedia, preserved the general principles and terminology of the ancient rhetoric—writers like Fortunatianus, Marius Victorinus, Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, Isidore, Alcuin, Notker, and Anselm of Besate. Thirdly, there were commentaries on, and translations of, Cicero, commentaries on and adaptations of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, and several commentaries on Capella, notably by John Scot, Dunchad, and Remigius of Auxerre. In the tradition of Alcuin and others that rhetoric is fundamentally a juridical art,⁵ concerned with speaking well in civil questions, there arose a group of works like the *Ecclesiastica rhetorica*⁶ of the second half of the twelfth century, virtually a forensic rhetoric for canon law, and professedly developed in accordance with rhetorical doctrine. Also in this tradition, and maintaining the alliance of rhetoric and law in the schools, there grew up from Carolingian times well into the later period a huge mass of tracts,

⁴ See Carolus Halm, *Rhetores Latini minores* (Leipzig, 1863).

⁵ "Qui Reticorique bien sauroit
Il connistroit et tort et droit"

says Gossuin of Metz (saec. xiii) in *L'image du monde*; Ch.-V. Langlois, *La vie en France au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1927), III, 161.

⁶ E.g., Cod. Lat. Monac. 4555 (saec. xiii), fols. 87 ff.; 22271 (saec. xii), fols. 143 ff. See Heinrich Siegel, "Über den Ordo Iudiciarius des Eilbert von Bremen mit Berücksichtigung der *ecclesiastica rethorica*," *Sitzungsb. der Kaiserl. Akad. der Wiss.* (Vienna), LV (1867), 531–53.

Artes dictaminis, devoted to letter-writing and legal administration. These were designed to prepare students for positions in the ecclesiastical and state chanceries; the *artes*⁷ assumed the name of rhetoric, and the teachers often called themselves "rhetors." Almost universally such tracts borrowed their *introductio* and stylistic from rhetoric, added *salutatio* and *petitio* to the Ciceronian divisions of *exordium*, *narratio*, and *conclusio*, frequently used the principles of invention, disposition, and *captatio benevolentiae*, and discussed *clausulae*, colors, and the modes of expanding material. Boncampagni pictures⁸ this kind of rhetoric as empress of the liberal arts, adorned with gold and precious stones, moving among roses and lilies of the valley. His fancy at least reflects the high esteem in which the rhetors held their art. And, finally, there were many special tracts on rhetorical colors.

Rhetoric then, as always, was in close kinship with grammar, and with that other member of the trivium, of which she is traditionally the *ἀνρίστροφος*, dialectic. The rhetorical use of the dialectical *τόποι*, developed by Aristotle, the *Auctor ad Herennium*, and Cicero, and for the Middle Ages especially by Boethius, in his *De differentiis topicis*, became of particular importance with the increased interest in dialectic that after the year 1200 attended the growth of scholasticism. To Alcuin,⁹ Roger Bacon,¹⁰ and Gerson,¹¹ rhetoric was a branch of logic; while Brunetto Latini,¹² Dante's teacher, places rhetoric under politics. And lastly, there was the usual interaction between rhetoric and poetry. In his study of the theories of poetry¹³ of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Professor Edmond Faral includes works just as properly belonging to the field of rhetoric, for example, the *Ars versificatoria* of Matthew of Vendôme and the *Poetica* of John of Garland.

Now, while there are signs that in the tenth and eleventh centuries

⁷ The works of Ludwig Rockinger are the most important for this branch of learning. See especially his *Briefsteller und Formelbücher des 11ten bis 14ten Jahrh.* (Munich, 1863-64; cf. also L. J. Paetow, *The Arts Course at Mediaeval Universities* (Urbana-Champaign, Ill., 1910).

⁸ Cf. Rockinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 128 ff. ⁹ See his treatise in Halm, *op. cit.*, pp. 525-50.

¹⁰ *Opera*, ed. J. S. Brewer (London, 1859), *Opus Tert.*, LXXV, 309.

¹¹ *Opera* (Antwerp, 1706), IV, 214 ff. and 571-82.

¹² Francesco Maggini, *La retorica di Brunetto Latini* ("Pubblicazioni del R. istituto di studi superiori: sezione di filosofia e filologia," Vol. XXXVIII) (Florence, 1915), and also his *La "rettorica" Italiana di Brunetto Latini* (Florence, 1912), p. 65.

¹³ *Les arts poétiques du xii^e et du xiii^e siècles* (Paris, 1924).

the interest in rhetoric had in some places somewhat abated, in the period we are now considering, from the twelfth century on into the fifteenth, its popularity is again unquestionable. The rhetorical education flourished in the schools¹⁴ of Europe, and especially France. With grammar it was a fundamental subject in cathedral schools, monasteries, and city schools, although in the new universities it had not yet won the influence that a great deal later it was to enjoy. And as one of the *artes sermocinales* it was included in the *studium artium* of the religious orders. Late in this period an anonymous rhetorician can with bold assurance maintain that "rhetoric is the science which refreshes the hungry, renders the mute articulate, makes the blind to see, and teaches one to avoid every lingual ineptitude."¹⁵

What I consider significant in mediaeval literature, as in the cathedral sculptures, is the theological environment of rhetoric. It is not strange that men of vision, like Roger Bacon, saw the value of rhetoric in moral philosophy. Nor is it surprising that William of Auvergne should write a *Rhetorica divina*,¹⁶ a rhetoric of prayer. I paraphrase slightly an introductory poem addressed to William:

When you teach suasion to the lowly, how to pour out words to God, the Creator becomes gentler toward the sin, and for your guidance grants pardon to the sinner. Quintilian, these are not your oratorical colors, nor are they yours, Marcus, glory of eloquence. Nor did he give them forth, the admired of Athens. Lost, vain, and treacherous was your wisdom, which taught only how to move the heart of a human judge. Whereas our lofty art teaches by prayer to mollify the just wrath of that great Judge, even God. Ah, how much better with words to placate the puissant and eternal Father than to dispense the words of human law!

¹⁴ On rhetoric in mediaeval education see particularly Paetow, *op. cit.*; F. A. Specht, *Geschichte des Unterrichtswesens in Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1885); F. H. Denifle, *Die Universitäten des Mittelalters bis 1400* (Berlin, 1885); F. A. Eckstein, *Lateinischer und griechischer Unterricht* (Leipzig, 1887); J. L. Clerval, *L'enseignement des arts libéraux à Chartres et à Paris* (Paris, 1889); Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1895); Hilarin Felder, *Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franziskanerorden* (Freiburg in B., 1904); H. Holzappel, *Handbuch der Geschichte des Franziskanerordens* (Freiburg in B., 1909); Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (Freiburg in B., 1909); Friedrich Paulsen, *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts* (Leipzig, 1919).

¹⁵ An anonymous *Rhetoric* published at Memmingen, 1490-95; see *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke*, No. 2671.

¹⁶ The copy I have consulted is in the Bibl. Nationale, Paris, Rés. D. 15239 (Hain-Copinger 8305).

This preface is an echo of chapter i, in which the author establishes an art of "spiritual oratory in causes and affairs of the soul. . . . If secular *oratio* has deserved so many works of laborious care, how much more worthy and just that sacred *oratio*, with which in fruit and utility the secular cannot compare, should have its artists and scholars?" William's art of prayer, like the Roman oration, embraces *exordium*, *narratio*, *petitio*, *confirmatio*, and *conclusio*.

But obviously the widest field for rhetoric in the Middle Ages was in preaching, the dissuasion from vice, and the persuasion to virtue, the winning of souls to God. With the spread of scholasticism and the rise of the great preaching orders, the Dominicans and the Franciscans, preaching flowered in practice and theory. In the twelfth century for the first time, and continually thereafter, the theory received treatment in special manuals—the *Quo ordine sermo fieri debeat* of Guibert de Nogent (saec. xii),¹⁷ the *Summa de arte praedicatoria* of Alain de Lille (end saec. xii),¹⁸ the *De instructione praedicatorum* of Humbert de Romans (saec. xiii),¹⁹ the Franciscan *Ars concionandi* wrongly attributed to St. Bonaventure,²⁰ *Artes praedicandi* professing falsely the authorship of Albertus Magnus²¹ and Henry of Hesse (*fl.* saec. xiv),²² and claiming the influence of St. Thomas Aquinas,²³ *Artes praedicandi* by the following:²⁴

¹⁷ *Prooemium ad commentarios in Genesim* (Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, Vol. CLVI, cols. 21–32).

¹⁸ Migne, *op. cit.*, Vol. CCX, cols. 110–98.

¹⁹ *Max. Bibl. Vet. Pat.*, ed. M. de la Bigne (Lyons, 1677), XXV, 426–567.

²⁰ *Opera omnia*, Suppl. III (Trent, 1774), cols. 385–417.

²¹ *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke*, Nos. 590–91. See R. Stapper, "Eine angeblich von Albertus Magnus verfasste *Ars praedicandi*," *Römeische Quartelschrift*, Suppl. xx. (Freiburg in B., 1913), pp. 388–402, and H. Kuhle, "zur angeblich von Albert d. Grosse verfassten *Ars praedicandi*," *Röm. Quart.*, (1928), pp. 324–8. The *incipit* is the same as that of William of Auvergne's *De faciebus (Veritas evangelica predicatoribus)*, and these incunabula are regarded as copies of that tract of William's; see Th. Charland, p. 47, in article cited in n. 24 below. In the present paper I refer to this tract as the "Albertus"-tract.

²² See Hain 8397, 8397, 8399, and Caplan, "Henry of Hesse' on the Art of Preaching," to appear in *Publications of the Modern Language Association*, XLVIII, No. 1 (June, 1933).

²³ See Caplan, "A Late Medieval Tractate on Preaching," in *Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of J. A. Winans* (New York: Century Co., 1926), p. 71.

²⁴ In the case of several names in the list the authorship of tracts is as yet not definitely certain. Until the problems are thoroughly investigated I tentatively accept the attributions of the MSS themselves, knowing full well from many of the cases above that have been studied how often such assignments are false. Furthermore, as regards several others in this list, references to tracts of their authorship are known, but as yet no

THIRTEENTH CENTURY	FOURTEENTH CENTURY	FIFTEENTH CENTURY
Alexander of Ashby (?)	Symon Alcock	St. Antoninus of Florence,
William of Auvergne ²⁵	Fr. Astazius, O.M.	O.P. ^{28a}
Arnoldus de Podio, O.P.	John Avonius, Carm.	Thomas von Cleve,
Jean de la Rochelle,	Robert of Basevorn	O.P. ²⁹
O.M.	Alphonsus Bononiensis	John Felton (?)
Richard of Thetford,	Franciscus Fabrianensis,	Jacques le Grand, O.S.A.
O.S.B.	O.M.	John of Guidernia
John of Wales, O.M. ²⁶	Philippus Florentinus,	Gozewijn Haeks, Carm.
	O.M.	Stephanus Hoest ^{29a}
	John Folsham, Carm.	Magister Koburek
	Jacobus Fusignani,	Paul Kölner of Ratisbon
	O.P. ²⁷	Martinus Alphonsus of
	Ranulph Higden, O.S.B.	Cordova, O.S.A.
	Robert Holcoth, O.P.	Michael of Hungary, ^{29b}
	Hendrik Aeger van	O.M.
	Kalkar, Carth.	Fridericus de Nuris
	Henry of Langenstein	Thomas Penketh, O.S.A.
	(Henry of Hesse, the	Ludovicus de Rocha,
	elder) ²⁸	O.M.
	Jean de Châlons	Silvester de Marradio,
	Raymond Lull, O.M.	O.P.
	Martin of Amberg	Hugo de Sueth, O.P.
	Nicolas Oresmius	Thomas of Salisbury
	Hermannus Teutonicus,	
	O.P.	
	Thomas de Tuderto,	
	O.S.A.	
	Baldo degli Ubaldi	
	Thomas Waleys, O.P.	
	Olivier de Went, O.P.	

MSS have been found by me. The enumeration here is not exhaustive, especially as to the fourteenth and fifteenth century; and where I have not made a personal examination of the MSS I may have inadvertently included other than strictly technical treatises. I have compiled, and mean soon to publish, a list of "Initia of Some Unpublished MSS of Mediaeval *Artes praedicandi*," representing my researches to date. For the early period see Th. Charland's valuable "Les auteurs d'*Artes praedicandi* du xiii^e siècle d'après les manuscrits" in *Etudes d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du xiii^e siècle* ("Publications de l'Institut d'Etudes Médiévales d'Ottawa") (Paris-Ottawa, 1932), pp. 41-60. The latter's forthcoming book on the *Artes praedicandi* should prove an enlightening contribution.

Father Charland has been so kind as to send me the following names, not obtained by me, which might be added to the list above: (*saec.* xiii) Denys de Gilleyo, Cist., and Thomas of Pavia (?), O.M.; (*saec.* xiv) François de Eximenis, O.M., Landulphe de Manzoriis, O.M., and Simon de Ragusa; (*saec.* xv) Aegidius (?), Christian Borgsleben,

and others. Add a goodly number of anonymous *Artes praedicandi* or *sermocinandi*, and as well numerous small tracts on methods of expanding a sermon. These systematic, carefully developed treatises are quite different from the rare, sketchy, and rudimentary attempts of the earlier period to give outline to the art. For example, a ninth-century manuscript (Cod. Lat. Monac. 22053, fol. 93) progresses as far as to list seven *modi* of preaching: (1) by teaching disciples; (2) by persuading people; (3) by chiding the haughty; (4) by refuting the contrary-minded; (5) by terrifying the lukewarm; (6) by assuaging the wrathful; (7) by promising life everlasting to the good and torments everlasting to the wicked. The manuals were scattered plentifully over the libraries of Europe. A catalogue of the year 1500 of the library of Tegernsee Abbey (Benedictine),³⁰ numbering from fifteen hundred to two thousand manuscripts, lists over fifty on rhetoric, and twelve *Artes praedicandi*; but this is perhaps a special instance. Tracts on rhetoric and preaching were indeed extremely popular, though I cannot prove that an art of preaching was ever so highly esteemed as the two *artes dictaminis*, by Peter de Vineis and Thomas of Capua, which the usurious wardrobe clerk, John of Ockham, lent to a friend— at a charge of a

O.M., Galfridus Schale, O.S.A., Hugo Sunfeld (?), Nicolas Eyfeler, O.M., and Dionysius Brisenus, O.S.A.

²⁵ A. de Poorter, "Un manuel de prédication médiévale," *Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie*, 1923, pp. 192–209. See also n. 21, above.

²⁶ Published anonymously as *Ars praedicandi sive informatio notabilis et praeclara de arte praedicandi* and as *Ars praedicandi*; see *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke*, Nos. 2669 and 2670, and Pellechet, Nos. 313 and 314. The MSS are also anonymous, except two that are pertinent: Mazarine 569, fols. 80^v–86^r, bearing the name of John of Wales, and Troyes 1922, fols. 87–95, bearing that of Humbert of Prully. The ascription, then, of this tract to John of Wales (throughout the present study) is merely tentative.

²⁷ Hain 7399, 7400, 8162, 8168.

²⁸ Erfurt (Amplon.) MS Qu. 151 (end saec. xiv), fols. 155–61v, regarded as genuine by F. W. E. Roth, "Zur Bibliographie des Henricus Hembuche de Hassia dictus de Langenstein," in *Beihefte zum Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* (Leipzig, 1888), II, 15. Cf. n. 22 above.

^{29a} *Summae sacrae theologiae, Pars III, Tit., XVIII* chaps. 3–6 (Venice, 1582), fols. 331–337^v.

²⁹ See n. 60.

^{29a} *Modus predicandi subtilis et compendiosus* (Strassburg, 1513); Brit. Mus. T. 1567. (1.).

^{29b} *Evagatorium, modus predicandi* (Cologne, 1503); Brit. Mus. 843. c. 20.

³⁰ Cod. Lat. Monac. 1925 (=21).

goose per week.³¹ These tracts are to my knowledge at least several score in number, the great majority still in manuscript form, unpublished.³² I have examined only a fair proportion of them, but feel confident that the general conclusions of this paper will be borne out when this attractive and unplowed field of research has been exhaustively worked. Further study of these documents is bound to throw light on a great cultural activity.

Having reviewed the different aspects of mediaeval rhetoric, I shall now indicate the attitude of theologians and preachers to rhetoric, consider briefly the acknowledged dependence of these *Artes* on classical rhetoric, and from a brief survey of their technique point out the general lines of the inheritance.

Even when regarded as different from preaching in origin, material, or purpose, rhetoric has been admitted to close kinship with it. In their view of pagan learning the Middle Ages show differences of opinion that warn us against generalization, but it is safe to say that the distrust of rhetoric as a profane study was not as anxious in the later period³³ as often in earlier times. One is tempted even to decide that the repeated expression of antipathy to secular learning was often more a convention than a proof of genuine belief or feeling.

Let us select for a spokesman that fierce opponent of the liberal arts, the Spaniard Paulus Albarus of the ninth century:

"In the beginning was the word and the word was with God and God was the word. The same was in the beginning with God (John 1:1)." This the learned Plato knew not, of this the eloquent Tully had no thought, into this fiery Demosthenes never inquired. The tortuous briar-bushes of Aristotle have it not, nor is it found in the sinuous subtleties of Chrysippus. The art of Donatus has not searched into this by the rules of art, nor yet the rank discipline of all the grammarians. The geometricians, named after the earth, follow what is earthly and dusty. The rhetoricians, wordy and redundant, have filled the

³¹ T. F. Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England* (Manchester, 1920), II, 226.

³² At present, without having made an exhaustive search in catalogues, I know of the existence of well over two hundred and fifty MSS.

³³ See Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, 59 ff., "Wertung und Verwertung der antiken Klassiker in der Literatur des 12. Jahrhunderts," for a discussion of the position of scholasticism with regard to profane studies.

air with empty wind. The dialecticians, bound fast by rules and entangled on all sides by syllogisms, crafty and cunning, are deceitful spinners of words rather than builders of the art of speech.³⁴

The state of mind herein exposed must not be regarded as by any means universal. To be sure, St. Augustine, former teacher of rhetoric, in his *Confessions* looks back with misgivings upon the days when, as he says, he "used to sell the talkativeness that emphasizes victory [*victoriosam loquacitatem vendebam*]" ; furthermore, one learns how flagrant he judged this offense to be from the fact that his next words refer to the lustful passion of his early years— so that the editors of a recent book of selections from this work are quite justified in stressing the collocation when they head the chapter as follows: "In my teaching of rhetoric and keeping a mistress I yet showed traces of Thee."³⁵ But the more significant tradition was set by St. Augustine in the *De doctrina Christiana*, Book IV, in which he depends heavily on Cicero's *Orator*, joins eloquence to religion, and proclaims the value of such profane wisdom for theology. This point is echoed by countless writers through the Middle Ages. Three quotations expressing the dominant attitude to pagan erudition recur: Prov. 9, 1: "Wisdom has builded her house; she hath hewn out her seven pillars [of the liberal arts]"; from St. Augustine: "It is no sin to despoil pagan thought of the gold of wisdom and the silver of eloquence, as by God's precept the Hebrews despoiled the Egyptians",³⁶ from the marriage law in Deut. 21: 12-13: "If the hair of the beautiful captive woman [pagan learning] shall be shorn and her nails pared, after that 'thou shalt go unto her, and be her husband, and she shall be thy wife.'"³⁷ In the influential *De clericorum instructione*,³⁸ Rabanus in effect writes: "Rhetoric, by which I understand the art of speaking well in civil questions, which seems to belong to mundane science, still is not extraneous to ecclesias-

³⁴ M. L. W. Laistner, *Thought and Letters in Western Europe, A.D. 500-900* (London, 1931), p. 268. For an excellent discussion of education and the seven liberal arts in the Carolingian period one should read all of chap. viii in this book.

³⁵ J. M. Campbell and M. R. P. McGuire, *The Confessions of St. Augustine* (New York, 1931), p. 116.

³⁶ *De doctr. Christ.*, II, 60.

³⁷ Doubtless through Jerome, *Epist.*, No. 70.

³⁸ III, 19: *De rhetorica* (ed. A. Knoepfler [Munich, 1900], pp. 225-26).

tical discipline, for skill in this art is useful to the preacher for fluent and proper teaching, as well as for apt and elegant writing, and for delivering a sermon. He does well who learns it fully, and so fits himself to preach God's word." Then, borrowing from St. Augustine (*De doctr. Christ.*, IV, 2): "For although rhetoric can sway to either truth or falsehood, who dares say that truth should be unarmed and defenceless, that only the false persuader should make his hearer *benevolus*, *intentus*, and *docilis*, should speak briefly, clearly, with verisimilitude, and, on the other hand, dares condemn the speaker of truth to a tedious, unintelligible, and incredible discourse?" To be sure, Robert of Melun (*saec.* xii), inspired by Plato, bids philosophers spurn rhetoric, which makes the false appear true and the true false, which emphasizes the *inanis suavis verborum* instead of the *fructuosa virtus sententiarum*, which aims to delight rather than profit, and feeds the ear rather than the soul.³⁹ Yet in the same century John of Salisbury, praising eloquence, declares that he who condemns so great a good is manifestly a fool.⁴⁰ "Honorius Augustodunensis" (*saec.* xii) in the striking work, *De animae exilio et patria*,⁴¹ conceives the soul, which is traveling in search of the fatherland, the wisdom of scripture, as first passing through the ten cities of the liberal arts, the third of which is Rhetoric, where Tully teaches the Roman virtues by ornate speech. The suburbs to this metropolis are History, Fable, and Books on Oratory and Ethics. Vincent of Beauvais (*saec.* xiii), who outlines well the traditional rhetoric in civil questions, using Cicero's *De oratore*, Quintilian, Isidore, and Boethius, would not in his *Speculum doctrinale* pass over the dignity and excellence of rhetoric; in preaching, however, he prefers the Christian, who acknowledges Holy Writ is paramount, to the Ciceronian.⁴² St. Thomas Aquinas (*saec.* xiii): "Eloquence and learning can profitably be used by a preacher."⁴³ In the same century, Ranulphe d'Homblières,⁴⁴ and in the next, John Bromyard,⁴⁵ oppose

³⁹ Quoted from the *Sententiae* by Grabmann, *op. cit.*, II, 350.

⁴⁰ *Metalogicus*, I, 7 (Migne, *op. cit.*, Vol. CXCIX, cols. 1, 3 ff.).

⁴¹ Migne, *op. cit.*, Vol. CLXXII, cols. 1243-44.

⁴² *Speculum majus* (Venice, 1591), II, 3, 99; IV, 1, 55; IV, 17, 52.

⁴³ See J. Walsh, "St. Thomas on Preaching," *Dominicana*, V (1921), 6-14.

⁴⁴ See Daunou in *Hist. litt. de la France*, XX, 14.

⁴⁵ *Summa praedicatorum*, Prologue and II, 12, 32.

secular literature when read for pleasure's sake, for the delight in poetic adornments and verbal ornamentation, but approve it when the useful therein is turned to Holy Writ. The "Aquinas"-tract, echoing William of Auvergne: "So many works have been written by rhetors on their art. How much worthier that the art and doctrine of sacred rhetoric should receive attention from the preacher-company."

The preacher does well to consider the cock, we read in a thirteenth century manuscript of Bruges (546, fol. 42^{vb}), if he would learn his various duties, and chiefly the duty he owes the liberal arts. The cock and the good preacher have seven qualities in common:

1. Before crowing, the cock beats his sides. Before preaching, the preacher must mortify himself.
2. To crow, the cock stretches his neck. So must the preacher lift his head; he must preach of heavenly things, and not mundane.
3. The cock crows only at certain hours. So does the preacher preach.
4. The cock shares his grain with his hens. The preacher must willingly communicate his wisdom to others.
5. The cock attacks his rivals. The preacher should attack all heretics.
6. The cock shuts his eyes before the sun. The preacher must shut his eyes to the blaze of success.
7. At nightfall the cock mounts to his wooden roost, and comes down only at daybreak. The preacher must at time of temptation climb to his perch—that is, consider the cross and the passion of Christ, and descend only when all danger has vanished.

But the cock possesses another "virtue." Before lifting his head to crow he bends a bit. So at times the preacher must incline to the liberal arts—not always, for he must lift his head—that is, must climb towards the higher wisdom, must *ad universitatem vel theologiam ire*, and not do as those who are so charmed by logic or grammar as never to be able to part from it, in the manner of the husband who knows not how to leave his wife.

Thus, even though we remember that in some cases rhetoric found a welcome place in civil matters but was not admitted in theology; even though occasionally the Psalter was considered sufficient to train a monk for his career;⁴⁶ and even though at times there was legislation within the religious orders against recourse to the profane arts, yet rhetoric clearly had an accepted place in theology and preaching. To be sure, the art did not in the Middle Ages attain to the full flower of its great days in classical civilization, when there existed a free envi-

⁴⁶ Felder, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

ronment for deliberative oratory. When scholars pass this judgment,⁴⁷ they cannot be gainsaid. Yet it is equally true that rhetoric in the mediaeval period flourished far more than is generally believed. It is incorrect to say, as Gröber does, that the Middle Ages were averse to it,⁴⁸ or to say, as Specht does,⁴⁹ that the art of speaking well could not concern a clerk or monk because his interest did not rest in this world.

What distrust there was for rhetoric was distrust for embellished style, because rhetoric was an art of adornment. "*Ornatu florum sermonem reddo decorum*," speaks rhetoric in a mediaeval chart of the liberal arts.⁵⁰ Elegance is neither necessary nor fitting for truth; elegance is reserved for *dictamen*. Alain opposes scurrilous and puerile words, and rejects rhythmic melodies, and metric consonances, because they soothe the ear rather than inform the mind; he would steer a middle course between purple trappings and bloodless words.⁵¹ "Albertus" has no faith in the sublimity of words, nor in the learned words of human science, as so much meretricious adornment, but desires verbal simplicity.⁵² The preacher's discourse should be neither scorned for rusticity nor suspected for a counterfeit grace and beauty. Humbert emphasizes content; to seek adornment is to prefer the beauty of the salver in which food is carried rather than the food itself.⁵³ The Franciscan *Ars concionandi*: "Use ordinary words; do not coin words, or you will be ridiculous." William of Auvergne: "The more simple and unadorned a sermon is, the more it moves and edifies."⁵⁴ Even Surgant,⁵⁵ in 1502: "Divine Rhetoric has no need for polished language."

What is noteworthy in these judgments is the rhetorical nature of the critique. Style was indeed studied, even *clausulae* were not neglected, and special tracts on rhetorical colors for use in sermons were common; but, as in classical theory, *λέξις* did not have equal importance with *εὔπεισις*. Style was subordinate to content.

⁴⁷ E.g., Paetow, *op. cit.*, chap. iii.

⁴⁸ *Grundriss der romanischen Philologie* (Strassburg, 1902), p. 252.

⁴⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁵⁰ Cod. Lat. Monac. 2689 (xiv), fol. 173v.

⁵¹ *Op. cit.* (Migne, *op. cit.*, CCX, 112).

⁵² Cf. Stapper, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ De Poorter, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

⁵³ *Max. Bibl. Vet. Pat.*, XXV, 432.

⁵⁵ Book I, *Consideratio* 19.

Now what influence of the ancient rhetoric do we find acknowledged in these tractates? The "Albertus"-tract uses Isidore's rhetoric. The Franciscan author of the *Ars concionandi* uses St. Augustine and Cicero, adopting their rhetorical aims—*docere*, *delectare*, *flectere*, and finding that divisions, through *proprietas*, fulfilled the purpose *docere*, that distinctions through *lenitas* served the aim *delectare*, and expansions through *utilitas* achieved the end *flectere*. He thus sets the thematic form of preaching, the unique contribution of mediaeval theory, squarely upon the basis of classical rhetoric. The "Aquinas"-tract, using Cicero's name, but really paraphrasing a passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Book iii, insists that it is not enough to have something to say, but it is necessary also to know how to say it. Humbert uses Seneca, Horace, and Cicero, and suggests that pagan history as well as Christian should be read by preachers. Alain, who in the treatment of rhetoric in *Anticlaudianus* cites Cicero, Quintilian, Sidonius, and Symmachus, in the *Summa de arte praedicatoria* quotes from Cicero, Plato, Seneca, Lucretius, and Persius; he approves of inserting the sayings of Gentiles. The dependence, then, on ancient authors and classical rhetoric is often highly conscious, and we are not in all cases left to infer the subtle effects of indirect influence. Indeed, the studies of Cruel, Linsenmayer, and Lecoy de la Marche would lead a reader to believe that in the actual practice of preaching recourse to the classics was more general a habit than even the theories indicate. For one example, Ovid is extensively used for moralization, even though, so far as I now know, the name of Ovid is absent from these *Artes*. The preacher would learn so to use Ovid from consulting the moralities, the tracts on vices and virtues, the collections of *sententiae*, *exempla*, and the like mediaeval books designed expressly for his aid, themselves rich in classical lore. With these I am not here concerned.

When we look at the pertinent classical works that were available for the formation of a theory of preaching, we find the logical works of Aristotle, which were the strongest basis of scholastic science, and lent themselves to rhetorical application; the *Categories* and *Topics*, directly or indirectly, seem to have contributed most. Add such rhetorical and dialectical works as Cicero's *Topics*, *De inventione*, and *De oratore*, Horace's *Ars poetica*; the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (regarded as Cicero's *Rhetorica nova*), which had a wide influence, as did the *Commentaries*

of Boethius⁵⁶ on Aristotle's *Categories* and *Topics*, and his own *De differentiis topicis*. Quintilian was perhaps used to a lesser degree.⁵⁷ One should note that in these classical works the emphasis is upon invention. And, indeed, I would say that the richest legacy bequeathed to mediaeval rhetoric from the ancient period was the principal of the inventional use of the *topos* or commonplace, the artistic finding of the right argument communicable to the right audience in the right circumstances. Developed in ancient theory for the three types of secular oratory—demonstrative, epideictic, and deliberative—it was admirably suited to the scholastic method and to the fourth kind of oratory, preaching. In accordance with classical doctrine the method was used in selecting the text and materials of discussion; further, as the peculiar sermon form demanded, in applying the very weighty principle of amplification; and, finally, in the study of the audience.⁵⁸ Neither before nor since has the method been carried out in such a systematic yet varied way.

The topical method operated at once in the enumeration of the proper materials of preaching — usually ten, as with "Aquinas" and "Albertus": God, the devil, the heavenly city, hell, the world, the soul, the body, sin, penitence, and virtue. "Albertus" (William of Auvergne, *De faciebus*) studies each of these by seven *loci* of disputation. In his *Ars praedicandi*⁵⁹ William devotes twenty chapters to repertories of ideas which shall serve the preacher as themes for artistic development.

The tracts are not all concerned with only one type of preaching; they vary in content, treatment, and, occasionally, point of view. They vary, too, in their definitions. Alain's is often quoted: "Preaching is open and public instruction in faith and morals, devoted to the informing of men, originating in the way of reason and proceeding from the source of authorities." The "Aquinas"-tract borrows this and offers also: "Preaching is the fitting and appropriate dispensation of

⁵⁶ See Grabmann, *op. cit.*, I, 149-60, "Boethius als Vermittler des Aristotelismus an das abendländische Mittelalter."

⁵⁷ For a *Fortleben* of Quintilian in this period, see F. H. Colson, *M. Fabii Quintiliani Institutionis oratoriae liber I* (Cambridge, 1924), *Introd.*, pp. xliii-lvi.

⁵⁸ See Caplan, "Rhetorical Invention in Some Mediaeval Tractates on Preaching," *Speculum*, II, No. 3 (July, 1927), 284-95.

⁵⁹ Part II.

God's word." "Henry of Hesse" supplies the following curious sentence: "The art of preaching is the science which teaches how to say something about something," but proceeds to explain that the subject of the art is the Word of God. And John of Wales provides this: "Preaching consists in invoking God's aid and then suitably, clearly, and devoutly expounding a proposed theme by means of division and concordance; its aim being the catholic enlightenment of the intellect and the enkindling, with grace, of emotion."⁶⁰ Guibert's treatise is an inner psychological study of the preacher rather than a technical manual. The author of the "Henry"-tract knows four kinds of preaching: the *postillatio* (by mystic interpretation of the terms of a text), the modern method (thematic), the *antiquus* (homily), the *subalternus* (a mixture of homily and modern). "Albertus" discusses three: the *tractatus* (homily), preaching through syllogisms and distinctions (equivalent to the modern and thematic), and preaching through poetic fictions. John of Wales treats four variations of the type developed by concordances. The author of the "Aquinas"-tract knows three kinds: The *antiquus* (called also the laical, beautiful, and popular); the smooth and simple, a variation of the thematic, with divisions but without distinctions; and the modern or thematic. And St. Antoninus offers seven methods of procedure.

Despite the outstanding opposition of such tracts as Humbert's, the thematic, in its varied forms and modifications, was the most popular method. It comprised a theme from Holy Writ; a protheme,⁶¹ also from the Bible, which should lead to a prayer invoking God's aid, and yet recall the theme; and divisions and subdivisions of the theme, by means of authoritative passages, from the Bible, the Church Fathers, and the philosophers, arranged largely in an artistic syllogistic order. This scheme was of course not inherited from classical rhetoric, which

⁶⁰ Mazarine MS 569, fol. 81^{va}, or Basel A VIII. 1, fol. 148^r. Florenz Landmann, *Das Predigtwesen in Westfalen* (Münster in W., 1900), p. 122, n. 1, gives this as also Thomas von Cleve's definition, Münster Paulin. MS 476, fol. 139. On p. 121, n. 8, he recognizes the close resemblance of the tract going under the name of Thomas von Cleve (*saec.* xv) and the anonymous treatise represented by *Gesamtkatalog*, Nos. 2669, 2670. This last is really a version of the thirteenth-century treatise now attached to the name of John of Wales. (cf. n. 26). A study of Paulin. 476.139-55 would be desirable.

⁶¹ See Etienne Gilson, "Michel Menot et la technique du sermon médiéval," *Revue d'histoire franciscaine*, II, No. 3 (July, 1925), 301 ff. This paper gives the best treatment thus far published on sermon-method.

could not have had such special needs in view. The Middle Ages are to be credited with inventing it. But the contribution of the principles of Aristotelian logic is evident in its form, so that a title of a tract may, like Jean de Châlons', read *De modo praedicandi et sylogizandi*,⁶² and preaching be defined as an "exposition of Holy Writ by division and subdivision." Were the modern student, fortified by a knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, to contend that the rhetorical enthymeme, not the syllogism is proper to the art of rhetoric, the mediaeval preacher would perhaps reply that sacred eloquence differs from secular in that its subject matter lies not in the realm of opinion and probability, but in truth and divine science; that it is as sound a procedure to use a dialectical method in the demonstration of truth as in the investigation of it; and, further, that in Aristotle and Cicero and Quintilian he had precedents for the policy of adapting to rhetorical purposes the methods of the allied art of dialectic. Petrus Cantor (*saec.* xii) makes clear this relationship of dialectic and rhetoric, so peculiar to scholasticism, in his idea of the edifice of the spirit. This is formed of *lectio*, the foundation, and *disputatio*, the wall, supporting *praedicatio*, the roof, which protects the faithful from the surge and whirl of vices.⁶³

In these tracts the part played by what one might term "purer" rhetoric was in the means of division and subdivision, namely, amplification, as a principle of both invention and disposition.

In examining a number of *artes* I note the following topics of expansion:⁶⁴ (1) Concordance of authorities, biblical, patristic, philosophic. (2) Questioning and discussion of words and terms, often with division—*Dominus illuminatio mea et salus*. Ask, why *dominus*, why *illuminatio*, why *mea*? (3) Discussion of the properties of things. Ps. 55:7: "God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness." Oil betokens grace, for it has a sanative virtue. (4) Analogies and natural truths. You love your parents. Your parents come from God. Therefore you must

⁶² Cod. Lat. Monac. 17290 (xiv-xv), fols. 136-46 ("ars . . . faciendi sermones secundum artem (formam) syllogisticam"); also Bibl. Nat. 173 (xiv), fols. 12-24v; Cod. Lat. Monac. 14580 (xv), fols. 152 ff.; Vat. Ottob. 396 (xv), fols. 14-29; Angers 324 (xv), fols. 128 ff.

⁶³ *Verbum abbreviatum*, chap. 1 (Migne, *op. cit.*, Vol. XXV, col. 25).

⁶⁴ There are several tracts outlining eight (the favorite number) methods. "Henry of Hesse," on the other hand, offers only three: division, question, and digression. This list is rather a composite (superficial, I am aware) of topics of *dilatatio* that are not necessarily distinct and separate, but obviously overlap.

love God. (5) Ratiocination and argument. This might be from simile, example, the topic of the greater and less, or from opposites, often with confirmation, refutation, and conclusion. In the later period argument could be presented by any of the following means: *syllogizando*, *inducendo*, *exemplificando*, or *enthymematizando*. In the favorite argument from opposites, vices might be set against virtues. St. Antoninus offers also an epideictic method of expansion, the praise or blame of the matter in hand. (6) Comparison, a play upon adjectives or verbs. A play on the topic of the greater and less: Judas' sin was great in that he was greedy; it was greater in that he betrayed his master; it was greatest in that he despaired of God's mercy. Or, following Richard of Thetford, the preacher could ring the changes upon *qu(a)eritur*, *requiritur*, *exquiritur*, *inquiritur*.⁶⁵ (7) Similitudes. Among the mediaeval books which "Henry of Hesse" advises for supplementary use by the preacher is the *Book of Similitudes*, the *Summa de exemplis et rerum similitudinibus libris decem constans* (ca. 1300) of Joannes Gorinus of San Gemignano, which supplies the preacher with every kind of material for moralistic comparison. (8) Explication by hidden terminology. Here perhaps may be found the source of the practice still operative today, of orating by the interpretation of initials—to which, no doubt, we must ascribe the high success of an alumni secretary who pleads with all elements that make up the university to hold FAST: *F*, the faculty; *A*, the alumni, *S*, the students; and *T*, the trustees! (9) Multiplication of synonyms. Ah, men's woes! He is oppressed by cares, surrounded by worries, vexed by adversity, and choked by perils. (10) Any or all of the dialectical topics like species and genera, whole and parts, and the categories: *quid*, *de quo*, *quare*, *quale*, *quantum*, *quando*, *ubi*. (11) Explication of scriptural metaphors. (12) Cause and effect, in the moral realm. (13) Anecdotes. The place of *exempla* in these tracts is yet to be investigated. (14) Observation of the end or purpose of a thing. (15) Setting forth the essential weight of a word. Sermons devoted to the mere word *et* were not unknown. (16) Interpretation of Hebrew names. (17) Etymology. Since *mulier* = *molliens herum* (William of Auvergne), one may see how unlimited was the service to tropology of this science.

⁶⁵ Paris, Bibl. Nat. Nouv. Acq. Lat. 280 (xiii-xiv), fol. 1; *Inc.*: "Octo modis potest aliquis habundare in themate."

Yet of such fancies was born the beautiful legend of Veronica⁶⁶—not Berenice (φερηνίκη) victory bearer, but Vera Icon, true image. (18) Parts of speech. (19) Rhetorical colors, as with Surgant,⁶⁷ at the end of this period (1502). (20) The use of the four senses of scriptural interpretation—historical or literal, allegorical, tropological—which is especially important in preaching because it looks to the correction of morals—and anagogical, which is explication from the point of view of heavenly things. A great proportion of the anonymous tracts, and also Bromyard, Guibert, the “Aquinas”- and “Henry”-tracts, and the *Ars concionandi* employ these senses as a means of prolonging a sermon in developing a theme; I have elsewhere discussed the history and popularity of the “four senses.”⁶⁸ The method is perhaps not quite lost to us even today,⁶⁹ and apparently was still popular in England well into the eighteenth century. I here offer what I fear is an unworthy illustration, from an account⁷⁰ of a sermon allegedly delivered by the notorious Dr. Dodd of Samuel Johnson’s day, which I coalesce with a seventeenth-century version, somewhat different, in a letter of Sir John Suckling.⁷¹ It will be noticed that this sermon illustrates also explication by hidden terminology, and, at the end, the principle of multiplying synonyms:

Certain drunken students of Cambridge, returning from a merry meeting at a country alehouse, by the way overtook Dr. Dodd, who in a sermon he had lately made on temperance, among other reproofs, as the sweet-sugared fellows constructed it, had termed them “malt-worms.” Wherefore they by violence took him and compelled him to preach a sermon upon the theme “Malt.” The reverend gentleman commenced: “Let me crave your attention, my beloved.

⁶⁶ Dante, *Paradiso*, XXXI, 104 and *Vita nuova*, XLI, 2-5.

⁶⁷ Ulrich Surgant, *Manuale curatorum* (Basel, 1506).

⁶⁸ See Caplan, “The Four Senses of Scriptural Interpretation and the Mediaeval Theory of Preaching,” in *Speculum*, IV, No. 3 (July, 1929), 282-90. Since that paper was written, I have by investigation learned that the principle of the use of these senses was extremely popular indeed among the tracts on preaching. A very interesting treatise, *Compendium de sensibus Sacrae Scripturae*, by Hermann von Schilditz, O.S.A. (saec. xiv), appears in MS A VII. 45, fols. 133-47, of the Universitätsbibliothek at Basel.

⁶⁹ The Jesuit Polcari, as late as 1859, gives careful attention to the four senses in his influential *Universae eloquentiae institutiones* (Naples), pp. 245 ff.

⁷⁰ A. C. Bombaugh, *Gleanings for the Curious from the Harvest Fields of Literature* (Philadelphia, 1876).

⁷¹ *A Book of Seventeenth-Century Prose*, ed. R. P. R. Coffin and A. M. Witherspoon, pp. 456 and 457, from Bodl., Ashm. MS 826, fol. 102r.

I am a little man, come at a short warning, to preach a short sermon, upon a short subject, to a thin congregation, in an unworthy pulpit. Beloved! My text is 'Malt.' There is no teaching without a division. I cannot divide my text into syllables, it being but a monosyllable. Therefore I must divide it into letters, which I find in my text to be four: *M-A-L-T*. *M*, my beloved, is moral; *A* is allegorical; *L* is literal; *T* is theological.

"First, the moral teaches such as you drunkards good manners; wherefore *M*, my masters, *A*, all of you, *L*, listen, *T*, to the theme; and therefore, *M*, my masters, *A*, all of you, *L*, leave off, *T*, tippling.

"Secondly, the allegorical is when one thing is spoken, and another meant. The thing here spoken is malt, the thing meant the oil of malt, which you rustics make *M*, your masters, *A*, your apparel, *L*, your liberty, *T*, your treasure.

"Thirdly, the literal sense hath ever been found suitable to the theme, confirmed by beggarly experience: *MA*, much ale, *LT*, little thought.

"Fourthly, the theological is according to the effects it works, which are of two kinds: the first in this world, the second in the world to come. The effects it works in this world are *M*, murder, *A*, adultery, *L*, looseness of life, and *T*, treason. In the world to come the effects of it are *M*, misery, *A*, anguish, *L*, lamentation, *T*, torment. And thus much for my text, 'Malt.'

"A word of caution, take this: A drunkard is the annoyance of modesty, the spoiler of civility, the destroyer of reason, the brewer's agent, the alewife's benefactor, his wife's sorrow, his children's trouble, his neighbor's scoff, a walking swill-tub, a picture of a beast, a monster of a man. But I much fear that I lose my labor, my theme showing that it is *M* to *A*, a thousand pounds to a pot of ale, that one knave of *L*, fifty, will ever leave to love potting."

By this time the ale and his persuasion had so wrought as they fell asleep, and the preacher closely crept away.⁷²

The *doctrina localis* is employed throughout in *dilatatio*. To the author of the *Ars concionandi* it is a *clavis* method, a "Key to the Scriptures," for it opens and closes the sense of a scriptural passage.

It is clear, then, that the sermon was studied from the point of view of *elocutio*, *inventio*, and *dispositio*. The preacher and the hearer were likewise not neglected.

The saying of Gregory, that whose life is despised so is his preaching, is often quoted. The "Aquinas"-tract recognizes preaching by deed as well as by word. Much attention is paid to the speaker's personality and habits. For example, St. Bonaventure sets down nine desirable qualities. He must be of the right age, not far from thirty; he

⁷² The story of a sermon recently delivered at Yale University is doubtless apocryphal. A student, deeply affected by an hour's varied exposition, in this style, of the true meaning of the monosyllable *Y-A-L-E*, is alleged to have piously expressed his thankfulness that he was not attending the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

must not be boyish either in appearance or in habits; he must have no bodily deformities; he must be strong, and of competent eloquence, well trained at least in grammar and Holy Writ, and able to speak without error or confusion; for his persuasive purpose he must be irreproachable in life and habits, industrious, prudent, and not contentious.⁷³ Evidently these sacred rhetors had a lively consciousness of the power of ethical persuasion.

These divine rhetors give as much thought to *pronuntiatio* as did the Roman authorities. A Berlin manuscript (Theol. Fol. 287 [saec. xv], fol. 310) offers, in verse form, the following aids to delivery: regulate your gestures; neither drag along nor run too fast; be very patient; keep the people in order happily; avoid shouting; suppress a cough; refrain from spitting; let your words be clear, not harsh, and never vile. The "Henry"-tract suggest a *vox acuta* in exposition, a *vox austera* in correction, a *vox benevola* in exhortation. The "Aquinas"-treatise sets forth specific gestures to express the emotions appropriate to different biblical verses: admiration, horror and excitement, irony and derision, elation, weariness and indignation, joy and hate. *Venite ad me omnes* must be uttered with gracious countenance and holding up of the hands. And the preacher should imitate the gestures he thinks Christ used in a given case. William's *Divina rhetorica* (chap. xxv) considers even the gestures of prayer and the part played in prayer by such *adjutoria* as blushing, weeping, groaning, and sighing. Among the preacher's vices listed in the "Henry"- and "Aquinas"-tracts are ignorance, lack of facility, excessive pointing of the fingers, tossing of the head, closing of the eyes, too much noisiness, remote digression.⁷⁴ The "Aquinas"-treatise also sets forth precautions: proper reverence, the clear and intelligible enunciation of every syllable; the avoidance of tedium and laughter by avoiding repetition or a deviation from the original plan of the sermon; an adequate summary to aid the hearer's memory; the comporting of one's self as if in Christ's presence; watching the hour and shunning prolixity, lest the people do not return.

The soundness of rhetorical judgment in these precepts arises from

⁷³ *Opusc.*, XIII, 360 b ff.

⁷⁴ Surgant (Book I, *Consideratio* 23) adds: voluntary baring of the teeth, uncontrolled features, indecent gestures, sleepy delivery, excessive briskness or speed. Petrus Cantor (*Verb. abbrev.*, chap. 1): "Excessive speed is the mother of oblivion and the stepmother of memory."

the close study that the theorists made of their audiences. But for the profound treatment of the emotions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, I would say that the classical rhetoricians never so thoroughly analyzed affections as the mediaeval theorists did the vices and virtues. Numberless tracts on this subject were purposely designed for the preacher's aid. Humbert has one hundred chapters on different audiences (*ad varios status*) with topical hints as to what they should be told—scholars, nobles, paupers, boys, harlots. St. Bonaventure studies the commonplace vices of certain audiences: if you address merchants, you must discuss fraud and mendacity; if soldiers, rapine and arson.⁷⁵ With audience in mind, he protests against involved sentences, and demands easy words within the capacity of the hearers to understand.⁷⁶ Jacques de Vitry had 120 categories of hearers.⁷⁷ The *Ecclesiastica rhetorica* reminds the speaker that there are seven primary emotions: fear, pain, sadness, shame, indignation, wrath, and hate of sin. Even the psychology of communication between speaker and audience is nicely imaged forth by "Albertus'" figure of preaching as a *desponsatio* or *matrimonium* of gospel truth; the bride is decked out with simple diction, and the witnesses to the alliance are arguments, examples, and parables.⁷⁸ But long before our period Gregory in his *Pastoral Rule* (Part III, Prologue) had asked the preacher to remember, when weighing the condition of his hearers, that some herbs nourish some animals and kill others, that a soft whisper quiets a horse but excites a puppy, that bread which gives the strong their strength afflicts children, and that in the ideal state the hearer's attention resembles the tense strings of the cithara. The sick, the simple, the rich, the sad—all kinds of people and all affections were examined by these preachers, and a therapeutic by opposites artistically employed. They followed the rule: *sermo coaptandus qualitati auditorum*,⁷⁹ and therein they well followed ancient precept. ἡθος, πίστις, and also πάθος—all were studied in this "art of arts, and science of the sciences."⁸⁰

⁷⁵ *Opusc.*, XIII, 359b.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, No. XVI.

⁷⁷ See the *Prooemium* to his *Sermones* (Antwerp, 1575).

⁷⁸ See Stapper, *op. cit.*

⁷⁹ E.g., so suggests the Franciscan author of the *Ars concionandi*.

⁸⁰ So called in the "Aquinas"-tract (Caplan, p. 71); cf. Gregory, *Pastoral Rule*, chap. i.

The theory of thematic preaching had its critics. Humbert considers vicious the current multiplication of distinctions and authorities.⁸¹ Gerson (*saec.* xiv-xv) calls the preachers of his day "sophists" because they use naught but crude logic, devoid of verbal adornment.⁸² Obviously to him they were incomplete artists, and insufficient rhetoricians. Roger Bacon's (*saec.* xiii) opposition also rests on rhetorical grounds: in the divisions, consonances, and verbal concordances, he finds neither sublimity nor great wisdom, but an infinite childish dulness and a cheapening of God's word; "of which ostentatiousness may God himself rid his Church; . . . it is perverse vanity lacking every rhetorical ornamentation and persuasive virtue."⁸³ Bacon desired beauty, emotion, and the study of such works as Seneca *On Wrath*; this he recommended as a thesaurus for special persuasive topics. Joly, eighteenth-century historian of preaching, consistent with the spirit of his times, savagely attacks the bizarre and ridiculous taste of these scholastics, their false subtleties, the tissue of texts, the exaggerated allegories, the excessive divisions and minute reasonings, and the insipid monotony of thoughts.⁸⁴ But while acknowledging the pedantry and concentrated formalism, we can find much to praise in the methodical ordering of the thematic sermon (the *arbor picta* is a favorite suffix to these tracts),⁸⁵ we can find much to laud, too, in the inventional scheme, and in the dexterity and practical variety of treatment, and can appreciate that the theory served its day well.

The influence of classical rhetoric on mediaeval preaching was therefore definite and considerable. Furthermore, from the nature of the preacher's education, from the wide interest in rhetoric in this period, from the persistence of the rhetorical tradition, and from the quality of some elements that we have considered in the mediaeval theory, I regard it as legitimate to assume an even greater contact and influence than one finds expressed or recognized. This is a safe assumption, even when one allows for the possibility that need and experience often create the development of a practice which is not always to be identified

⁸¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. vi.

⁸² *Lectio 2 super Marcum, Opera* (Antwerp, 1706), IV, 217.

⁸³ *Op. tert.*, chap. lxxv.

⁸⁴ J. M. E. Joly, *Histoire de la prédication* (Amsterdam, 1767), p. 201.

⁸⁵ Such an *arbor* appears at the end of the "Aquinas"-tract in some editions (cf. Cod. Lat. Monac. 23865, fols. 19^v-20.)

with conscious art, nor is to be referred to rules derived from an alien source. But the Middle Ages never achieved that complete synthesis of homiletics and classical rhetoric that we begin to find in the Renaissance. It is only in that period and later that manuscripts appear in which the classical authors are fully searched and carefully excerpted for the specific use of preachers.⁸⁶ Then, as in Chytraeus' *Praecepta rhetorica*, Cicero, Pericles, and Demosthenes are studied together with St. Basil and St. Paul.⁸⁷ Then appear such descriptions as Reuchlin's in his *Liber congestorum de arte praedicandi* (1503):⁸⁸ a preacher is a *vir religiosus dicendi peritus*, which converts the elder Cato's famous definition of the orator as a *vir bonus dicendi peritus*; and the matter of preaching is everything offering itself to make us daily better, on which the preacher knows how to speak well. Then appears the rhetorically scientific division of the kinds of preaching into the didactic, epitreptic (devoted to inducing belief), and paraenetic (directed to persuading men to a course of conduct), which Melancthon devised in a system of sacred rhetoric firmly based on classical rules.⁸⁹ It is much later when, in *Polyhistor*,⁹⁰ Morhof, a severe critic of what he terms the barbarous preaching of the scholastic period, insists there is no distinction between civil and sacred oratory except in subject matter; that the precepts and method are the same in both, and all inspiration is to be drawn from Aristotle. But, although the greatest of all oratorical theories, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, was known in translation in the thirteenth century, mediaeval preaching had no demonstrable first-hand contact with it. The first direct quotation from this book that I have thus far found in any of these *artes* is in Surgant (1502),⁹¹ and it is more than a century later when Peacham in the *Compleat Gentleman* (1622)⁹² refers offhand to the reputation enjoyed by Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a book suf-

⁸⁶ Cf. Cod. Lat. Monac. 18635, fols. 67-123 (saec. xv-xvi): "Tractatus de rhetorica ex Tullio, Quintiliano, aliis excerptus in usum praedicatorum."

⁸⁷ Ed. Leipzig, 1562.

⁸⁸ In *De arte concionandi formulae* . . . Ioanne Reuchlino. anonymo quodam rhapsodo, Philippo Melancthone, D. Ioanne Hepino autoribus (London, 1570), fols. 2-19v; Brit. Mus. 4499.a.30.

⁸⁹ *De officiis concionatoris*, in *De arte concionandi formulae*, fols. 54-61.

⁹⁰ (Lübeck, 1747), I, 6, 4: *De rhetoribus atque oratoribus sacris*.

⁹¹ Book I, *Consideratio* 6.

⁹² Ed. G. S. Gordon (Oxford, 1906), p. 45.

ficient to make both a scholar and an honest man. So far as I know, it is only in modern times that to the three classical types of oratory, forensic, deliberative, and epideictic, the sacred has been added as a fourth,⁹³ thus gaining a rightful place among its fellows within the rhetorical art. And indeed, only quite recently has been developed the systematic classification of the *ars praedicandi* itself into its genera, the *concio*, the *laudatio*, the *homilia*, the *enarratio sacrarum litterarum*, and the *oratio funebris*, as by the Jesuit Polcari.⁹⁴ The preaching of the Renaissance and modern times drank more deeply, yet mediaeval theory also tasted more than superficially at the fount of classical rhetoric.

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⁹³ E.g., D. Ferrari, *L'arte di dire* (Milan, 1907).

⁹⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 217 and 239 ff.

THE FOUR ELEMENTS IN THE *PROMETHEUS* *VINCTUS*

BY S. M. ADAMS

ὦ δῖος αἰθήρ καὶ ταχύπτεροι πνοαί, 88
ποταμῶν τε πηγαί, ποντίων τε κυμάτων
ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα, παμμῆτόρ τε γῆ,
καὶ τὸν πανόπτην κύκλον ἡλίου καλῶ.

IT IS not generally noticed that in these, his first words, Prometheus is appealing to the great elements—Aither, Water, Earth, and, in place of Fire, the Sun. But this is the basis of the poetic design. Prometheus, friend of man, is the son of Earth; he has stolen Fire; and his appeal is answered in the drama by Water, in the persons of Okeanos and the Okeanides. Notice the last lines of the poem:

ὦ μητρὸς ἐμῆς σέβας, ὦ πάντων 1091
αἰθήρ κοινὸν φάος εἰλίσσων,
ἔσορᾷς μ' ὥς ἔκδικα πάσχω.

The stolen element, Fire, was missing from the first appeal; here Water, which has now played its part, is omitted: the Titan's final cry is raised to Earth and Aither only.

I propose to make a preliminary examination of the *Prometheus* from this angle. We shall be dealing, I think, with something more than either symbolism or allegory. The four elements are here conceived of as actual forces pervading and transcending both the world of man and the sphere of the gods. Therefore, when god strives against god before the judgment seat of Ananke, the battle may well be staged in the mysterious realm of these elemental powers. I shall suggest, also, that it is fought with weapons of "magic"; but first notice the parts played by Fire, Earth, and Water:

1. With a pronounced change of construction to emphasize the point, Prometheus calls on the Sun in place of the expected fourth element, Fire. This substitution is clearly not only artistic but essential. The Titan has given mankind the "seed of fire"; and man's

possession of fire is in this drama synonymous with civilization,¹ as the sophist Protagoras understands it in the dialogue of that name. The gift was *πέρα δίκης* (vs. 30). Man had no right to fire. He was born to a heritage of earth and water and air, an animal with no more than an animal's equipment for existence. That point is the theme of the remarkable passage, verses 442 ff. Fire was formerly for the use of gods alone, and Prometheus erred, as he readily and even urgently admits (vs. 268). He cannot therefore in justice call upon Fire in his hour of need, for the guilt of its theft is on him.

2. Earth already stands ally to Prometheus. Gaia is the mother of the Titans, and all the *γῆγενεῖς* were aligned against the new tyrant of the gods. For the time being the Titans have been subdued by Violence; but they are by no means permanently impotent: the case of Typhos (vss. 369 ff.) is designed to show us that. Most significant is the fact that in this drama Prometheus' mother Themis (who has fore-armed her son by acquainting him with the future) is identified with Gaia, *πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφὴ μία* (vs. 212). We have here just such a remodeling of theology as Verrall found in the opening scene of the *Eumenides*; and the reason for it becomes apparent if we admit the poetic design which I infer. And all this harmonizes with the normal Greek idea that Earth is always man's friend. She will naturally stand on the side of man's great benefactor.

3. So is it with Water. The rivers are man's friend, but the Sea, for all its smiles, may prove a foe. That is precisely what is reflected here. Water is in part man's splendid ally, in part a professed friend who cannot be relied upon: the Okeanides share the Titan's "toils" with sympathy and renunciation,² while Prometheus in his wisdom will not trust the specious promises of Okeanos, the Sea.

We have now to consider the part played by Aither, mentioned first and last in the two appeals. Now, Earth and Water and Fire have for the life of man a significance readily understood: Aither had for the Greeks a significance much less familiar to ourselves. Aither is *ἀγνὸς πόρος οἰωνῶν* (vs. 282). And *οἰωνοί* are not "birds" only, but

¹ This is not allegory; it is poetic fact.

² It is this underlying notion which really motivates the Nymphs' participation in the catastrophe. Granted the poetic design, their choice is inevitable.

also "omens"; and all *οἰωνοί* are not precisely and literally "birds."³ I suggest that we may find here the significance we seek: Aither is the field of combat, and the weapons are *οἰωνοί*, "omens."

The suggestion may seem at first grotesque. I would therefore point out at once that it will explain things apparently much more grotesque: the "winged car" of the Okeanides, for example, and the *τετρασκελής οἰωνός* of Okeanos. These we can now see not as gratuitous embellishments of a somewhat overdone poetic fancy, but as requisite to the design of the drama; those who take part in this struggle come equipped for the fray. It has been driven home to us through some eighty verses at the beginning of the drama that Prometheus is physically helpless; so far as Physical Violence can carry him, Zeus has quelled his adversary: *Κράτος Βία τε, σφῶν μὲν ἐντολή Διὸς | ἔχει τέλος*, says Hephaistos. But it is obvious that the struggle is still going on; and I am suggesting that it is now transferred from the physical plane to that of verbal magic. The Titan's visitors, since they cannot now affect him *ἔργῳ*, seek to do so *λόγῳ*. Prometheus himself is an *αἰθέριον κίννγμα* (vs. 158), *ὑπαίθριος δεσμοῖς πεπασσαλευμένος* (vs. 113). The Nymphs and their father come to him by means of wings. Hermes by tradition will be winged. Io, of course, is not; but she is not a voluntary participant in the affair; she belongs to the human race; and though she is vital to the struggle, she is not an agent but an instrument.

It will be evident that this chimes with the dominant idea that deliverance will come to Prometheus if he keeps his secret.⁴ It is a development of the theme *χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καίρια*.⁵ In this drama Prometheus must know when and how to speak, and when to keep silence: *οὔτε σιγᾶν οὔτε μὴ σιγᾶν τύχας | οἶόν τέ μοι τάσδ' ἐστί*, he remarks (vss. 106-7)—an expression with which should be compared Frag. 208 (assigned to the Prometheus dramas): *σιγῶν θ' ὅπου δεῖ καὶ λέγων τὰ καίρια*. And it is not only the hero who, like Eteokles, must so control his utterances: the motif of the magic efficacy of words is applied to all the characters alike. It is not merely underlying the "action," it is the action; and if there is this action, however archaic, the poem is, after all, drama.

³ This is of course a commonplace of Greek thought. A usual reference is Aristoph. *Av.* 719-21.

⁴ Cf. vss. 519-25.

⁵ See J. T. Sheppard, *Class. Rev.*, 1911, pp. 220 ff.; *ibid.*, 1913, pp. 73 ff.

I believe we have here a deliberate throwback to a magic ritual out of which tragedy grew, a ritual in which words are potent—helpful or injurious or capable of different meanings:⁶ the kind of thing Solon feared would come to be found in Athenian “contracts” if the secular performances of Thespis met with general approval.⁷ It seems hardly necessary to remark that every Greek knew, or had heard, that words could *do* things; and even if by the time of Aeschylus this belief in the magic power of words had lost some of its savor as one of the practical features of life, it had an honorable tradition, and might well be material for a poet who proposed to treat of the mystic early warfare of gods.

A brief outline of the drama, thus interpreted, follows:

1. *Prologue* (1–127).—The stage is set for the struggle.

Kratos and Bia (the *hand* of Zeus, so to speak) have finished their task, and Prometheus is rendered physically helpless by the god whose *γέρας* he stole and who has warned him that he must play the sentry at his rock (vs. 31). Prometheus appeals to the elements. The contest is now at hand; that is why this god who does not fear the power and violence of Zeus himself cries:

φεῦ, φεῦ, τί ποτ' αὖ κινάθισμα κλύω
πέλας οἰωνῶν; αἰθήρ δ' ἐλαφραῖς
πτερύγων ῥιπαῖς ὑποσυρίζει.
πάν μοι φοβερὸν τὸ προσέρπον.

2. *The Okeanides scene* (128–285).—Prometheus wins the Nymphs to share his labors.

They recognize that Prometheus has “erred”; but they consent to aid him because his sufferings are due to his having saved and aided man. Yielding to his entreaty, they abandon their winged car and αἰθήρ ἀγνὸς πόρος οἰωνῶν. When they do this they must, according to our theory, renounce their magic agency. But that is precisely what the dramatic structure now requires, for they are the Chorus. They have thus far played an actor’s part, but with the advent of other actors they must assume the Chorus’ normal rôle: they cannot possess a power to intervene between that of Prometheus and that of e.g., Okeanos.

⁶ I.e., not ἀπλοῖ λόγοι; cf. vss. 46, 610, 975.

⁷ Cf. Plut. *Solon* 29.

Note that their first words contain at least one expression of favorable omen: *πατρώας μόγυς παρειπούσα φρένας*. Since it is by virtue of *πατήρ*-right that Zeus wields his power (cf. vss. 4, 17), they are especially qualified to aid Prometheus.⁸

3. *The Okeanos scene* (286-398).—Okeanos tries in vain to ruin the cause.

Like the preceding, this scene opens and closes with references to *οἰωνοί*. But Okeanos guides his "omen" *γνώμη στομίῳν ἄτερ*—with a purpose, but no curb. He does not observe the precept *χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καίρια*. And he fails. He urges surrender and a plea for mercy. He is especially qualified to vitiate Prometheus' efforts, for he himself, after having assisted Prometheus (*πάντων μετασχὼν καὶ τετοληγκῶς ἔμοι*, vs. 333), made just such a surrender as he now advocates. His language is ill-omened.⁹ He puts into words the possible dire consequences of Prometheus' own language (vss. 313, 320, 330); he makes bad things worse by calling them bad. It is all, you see, a question of *words*. It is specious pleading, and dangerous; but Prometheus stands the test. With his knowledge of the future he understands that he must in justice fight on, *σιγῶν θ' ὅπου δεῖ καὶ λέγων τὰ καίρια*. He knows the Sea's promises are untrustworthy; he will even doubt Okeanos' desire to plead his cause for him (vss. 342-45). He turns the evil omens of this visit by the fair words of his reply, with which his reaction to Hermes' threats should be contrasted, and by his recital of the case of Typhos in particular.¹⁰

Notice verse 336: *πάπταινε δ' αὐτὸς μὴ τι πημανθῆς ὀδῶ*, with Okeanos' answer: *ἔργῳ κοῦ λόγῳ τεκμαίρομαι*.

4. *The "civilization" story*.—Man's rise from the animal state. In

⁸ I suspect, too, that notions of swiftness (*θοαῖς*, *κραινοφόροι*, *σίθην* in this passage) are of good omen. Such guesswork may be justified by the prevalence and prominence of certain ideas which one instinctively regards as cheerful, favorable, by contrast with their opposites, and by the certainty that Aeschylus is not given to the use of casual epithets. So with *ἀπίδολος* (vs. 135): "unshod feet" is an idea not unknown to ritual. Note, in passing: *δίδαζον ἡμᾶς εἴ τι μὴ βλάπτει λόγῳ* (vs. 198).

⁹ His opening anapaests are rich in ambiguities.

¹⁰ Okeanos ends the episode with the curious expression *κάμψειεν γόνυ*. Concerning this a guess may, I think, be hazarded. The idea of the "bent knee" is highly ominous, and this use of it is evil, while that of Hephaistos (vs. 32) was favorable. See vss. 487-88; *S. c. T.* 775-76, with Tucker's illuminating note *ad loc.*; *Ag.* 343-44; Aristoph. *Av.* 359; examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

this account there is a great deal of emphasis on augury and kindred arts. The scene ends on the "secret" motif, and the phrasing of verses 522-25 is worth attention.

5. *The Io episode* (561-886).—Io threatens to cheat the future of fulfilment, being in the mood for suicide, but is cured by Prometheus.

The daughter of Inachus asks the Titan to show her a *φάρμακον* for her *νόσος* (vs. 606). That is the keynote of the episode. Words, we have already been told (vs. 380), are *ιατροὶ ὀργῆς νοσοῦσης*; and the subsequent descriptions of Io's wanderings are due not to "interest in geography," but to the fact that Prometheus is *making* her persevere (cf. vss. 705-6).¹¹ Ultimate deliverance depends on the fulfilment of her part and the task of Prometheus is to send her on her way encouraged by the certainty of final blessedness. From the point of view of magic, his words *compel* her. The drama of the episode reaches a crisis with her curse (vss. 684 ff):

μηδὲ μ' οἰκτίσας
σύνθαλπε μύθοις ψευδέσιν. νόσημα γὰρ
αἴσχιστον εἶναι φημι συνθέτους λόγους.

Our theory enables us to grasp the powerful effect of these words, and we can understand why the Chorus immediately bursts forth in brief but impassioned lyric (vss. 687-95).¹² But Prometheus is not dismayed; he still has much to tell, more *σύνθετοι λόγοι* to use *ἐν καιρῷ*, included in which is a further development of the "secret" motif. And in the end Io goes her way, under a fresh onset of her *μανίαι*, yet so far cured of her *νόσος* that her final words are an offset to her former ill-omened utterance:

ἔξω δὲ δρόμον φέρομαι λύσσης
πνεύματι μάργω, γλώσσης ἀκρατῆς·
θολεροὶ δὲ λόγοι παίουσ' εἰκῇ
στυγνῆς πρὸς κύμασιν ἄτης.

¹¹ It may be suggested that the narratives of Io's wanderings are a kind of *Pilgrim's Progress*. Notice the number of warnings! That the proper names themselves are significant is perhaps indicated by the strange *Τβριστὴν ποταμόν* of vs. 717 (for which Headlam was moved to conjecture *Ἀρακτὴν*). Cf. the "Scythian stranger" of *S. c. T.* 714-15. It is worth mentioning also that of fragments assigned to the *Luomenos* no fewer than four (195, 196, 198, 199) are similarly "geographical."

¹² Here notice *ἔνοι λόγοι* and the possible double significance in the last verse, i.e., not only "Io's condition" but also her "conduct."

6. *The Hermes episode.*—Hermes brings from Prometheus desperate words that subject him to the catastrophe.

The tendency toward excessive freedom of utterance with reference to Zeus, against which the Chorus has been warning Prometheus at intervals, has become more marked (vss. 906 ff.) and makes a fitting prelude to this final episode in which Hermes, *speaking* for Zeus (as Kratos and Bia *acted* for him in the former struggle), details the further punishment decreed by his master in the event that the secret is not revealed. This tendency—the *ὑβρις* of Prometheus—develops through the scene and culminates in a magnificent defiance (vss. 1043–53). In very different tones from those of his original appeal the Titan cries out to Aither and Earth and Sea: let them be thrown into confusion, a chaos of elements. He thus calls down the catastrophe upon himself, and as it breaks upon him he marks the close of the present conflict:

καὶ μὴν ἔργῳ κούκῃτι λόγῳ. . . . 1080

But the end is not yet. Χθὼν σεσάλευται . . . ξυντετάρακται δ' αἰθήρ πόντῳ. Yet he can still appeal to Earth, his Mother, and to Aither, in which move the light and safety of the universe.

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THE TOPICS OF COUNSEL AND DELIBERATION IN PREPHILOSOPHIC GREEK LITERATURE

BY EDWARD BOUCHER STEVENS

THE purpose of this study is the tracing of the proverbs and literary topics of counsel and deliberation from the earliest forms in which they appear throughout their development in Greek literature or up to their appearance and development in Greek philosophy. Greek theories of deliberation are thus generally excluded from this essay. Deliberation I assume here to be either a kind of inner conversation of a mind with itself¹ or a conversation of a deliberative nature between two or more persons. Advice or counsel (save that counsel has also the meaning "deliberation," e.g., in the translation of *εὐβουλία* as "good counsel") I assume to be one part of such a deliberation, consulting or asking for counsel another part of it.

Some further apparent confusion arises from the fact that the word *βουλή* may mean "counsel" in the sense of deliberation, or "counsel" in the sense of decision arrived at in deliberation. Where the latter is quite predominant, I have in the main considered the context without the bounds of this paper. *Εὐβουλος*, which I translate "of good counsel," "of good deliberation," or "well-advised," means "able to deliberate to one's own advantage." However, the ability to deliberate well implies too the ability to recognize good deliberation and the good advice arising from good deliberation.

Some of the topics of this literature require little more than passing mention. Others combine in such a way as to offer an interesting illustration of the general trend and development of Greek thought and literary tradition. The first topic to appear, the conjunction of counsel and action, found in a conventional description of Odysseus,² and in isolated instances in later literature,³ is of the former type. In Poly-

¹ Cf. Plato on thought at *Theaet.* 189 E-190 B with Campbell's note; *Phileb.* 38 C, *Soph.* 263 E, Arist. *De memoria* 453 a 9 ff., and Friedrich Leo's *Der Monolog in Drama*.

² B 272-73; ξ 491; τ 241 f.; Eur. *Rhesus* 861-62.

³ Hes. *Theog.* 896; Pindar *Pyth.* iii. 30, iv. 72, and v. 119; *Soph. OT* 1417; Isoc. vi. 72; Erasmus *Adagia* iii. 10. 28.

damas' reproof of Hector (N 726 ff.), paraphrased in Euripides' *Rhesus* 105, εἴθ' ἦσθ' ἀνὴρ εὐβουλος, ὡς δρᾶσαι χερί, is found the first instance of the antithesis of counsel and action, a topic implicit in many other commonplaces of the literature of deliberation. Pindar plays upon it (*Nem.* i, 27 ff.); the tragedians avail themselves of it (Aesch. *Prom.* 619; *frag. adesp.* 540 N; Ion, *frag.* 63), or compress it into *sententiae*;⁴ it enters into Xenophon's picture of the ideal man (*Ages.* x. 1); and occasionally it passes for the more common opposition of λόγος and ἔργον (*Soph. Phil.* 555 f., and Libanius x. 55. 7).

Hardly to be distinguished from this topic is the assignment of counsel to age and deeds to youth, first appearing by implication in Nestor's reply to Diomedes at *Iliad* ix. 53-61, expressed more sharply by Pindar, *frag.* 199, and offered as an old proverb by Euripides, *frag.* 508, and the paroemiographers (Leutsch and Schneidewin, I, 436). Pindar's praise of a young man at *Pyth.* iv. 281-82 suggests Milton's "young in years but in sage counsel old." Excellence in counsel becomes a topic in the praise of old age.⁵ To be included in this topic, but depreciatory rather than laudatory, are Hesiod's threefold division giving deeds to youth, counsel to men in their prime, and only wishes to old men (*frag.* 220), and Bacon's "Men of Age . . . consult too long."⁶ Thucydides has the topic in mind at vi. 18, 6; and it is given full rhetorical development in Isocrates' *Archidamus* 1-4, a passage glanced at in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, chapter xxix. In actual practice it appears that men over fifty were invited by the herald to address the assembly first (Aeschines *Against Timarchus* 49 and Plutarch *Moralia* 784 C).

Nestor exhorts Agamemnon with the words αὐτός τ' εὖ μῆδεο πείθεό τ' ἄλλω (B 360); and Erasmus formed therefrom the adage, "Consulendum et consilii parendum" (*Adag.* 910 C). But the *locus classicus* for the distinction between taking counsel with one's self and being counseled is Hesiod's familiar lines (*W. and D.* 293-97) to the effect that he

⁴ Soph., *frag.* 939 P; Eur., *frag.* 200. 3, quoted Polyb. i. 35. 4, and Plut. *Mor.* 790 A, and made the subject of a rhetorical exercise by Nicolaus, Walz, *Rhet. Graec.*, I, 278-79. Cf. also Thucyd. iii. 48. 2.

⁵ Soph., *frag.* 260; Eur., *frag.* 291; Antiphon (Nauck, p. 793); Bion the Cynic at Diog. Laert. iv. 50.

⁶ Cf. also Vauvenargues, *Réflexions et maximes*, 159 and 518; La Rochefoucauld, *Maximes*, 93; and the parody of Hesiod at Strabo 675.

is best who knows all things himself, he next who obeys good advice, but that he who has neither qualification is utterly worthless. The many citations and expansions of these lines in antiquity are given at the passage by Rzach, who, however, omits the first reference, one noted by Stein at Herodotus vii. 16.⁷ An interesting development in the fortunes of Hesiod's lines is the alteration which Zeno the Stoic made of the first and third lines, an alteration paraphrased by the scholiast,⁸ τῇ εὐπειθείᾳ τὰ πρωτεῖα διδοῖς, τῇ φρονήσει δὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα. The scholiast adds: "Aristippus the Socratic, on the contrary, said that being in need of a counselor is worse than being a beggar." This comment may be traced to Diogenes Laertius ii. 70, where Aristippus is credited with saying, "It is better to be a beggar than to be uneducated. For the one lacks money, the other culture." Themistius espouses Zeno's version, finding it a further support of Aristotle's criticism of Plato—otherwise unattested—that kings had better listen to the advice of philosophers than be philosophers themselves.⁹

Theognis, whose maxims, along with those of Hesiod and Phocylides, Isocrates calls ὑποθήκαι or τὰ συμβουλευόντα,¹⁰ offers the first instances of many of the commonplaces of counsel and deliberation. The injunction "deliberate slowly," first found in so direct a form in Thucydides i. 78. 1, grew out of two passages of Theognis, one of which, with a play on the proverb δις καὶ τρίς τὰ καλὰ, is βουλευόν δις καὶ τρίς (633),¹¹ and the other a freer expansion of the idea at 1051–54, μή ποτ' ἐπειγόμενος πράξης κακόν, ἀλλὰ βαθείη / σῇ φρενὶ βούλευσαι σὺ ἀγαθῷ τε νόῳ κτλ., echoed at Herodotus vii. 10. 6, and at Thucydides i. 85. 1, μηδὲ ἐπειχθέντες βουλεύσωμεν. Sophocles once (frag. 856) and Thucydides often (cf. i. 72. 1 and vi. 9. 1) offer variations on the theme; and Plato may refer to it at *Crito* 52 E, where the personified Laws remind So-

⁷ La Rochefoucauld, *op. cit.*, 283, might be paraphrasing Herodotus.

⁸ Plutarch or Proclus. See Gaisford, *Poetae minores Graeci*, II (1886), 168 f.; Westervickius, *De Plut. studiis Hesiodicis* (1893); and Ueberweg-Praechter, *Gesch. d. Philos.*, pp. 623 f.

⁹ Them. *Or.* viii; Plato *Rep.* 473 C–D; Arist., frag. 647. But cf. Newman, *Arist. Pol.* i. 410, n. 2.

¹⁰ ii. 42–43. Cf. Theog. 37–38, 69–72, and 1049.

¹¹ Eustathius i. 57. 28 cites a "proverb," αἱ δευτεραί πως φροντίδες σοφώτεραι, quoting Eur. *Hippol.* 436, and credits Homer with the idea. For the proverb see Leutsch and Schneidewin i. 62. J. S. Mill favors "first thoughts" (*Diary*, January 30, 1854).

crates that his agreements with them were not made under duress or procured contrary to law,¹² inasmuch as he had seventy years in which to deliberate upon them. The defendant in Antiphon's *De Herodis nece* avails himself of the commonplace at length (§§ 73 and 94). Again, the antithesis of counsel and action recurs in the development of the topic at Isocrates i. 34, *βουλεύου μὲν βραδέως, ἐπιτέλει δὲ ταχέως τὰ δόξαντα*; and this form of the antithesis seems to be a variation on Herodotus' "It were best for a man if in his deliberations he were fearful . . . but in the execution he were bold."¹³ Aristotle adduces the saying that one ought to act quickly on the decision arrived at in deliberation, but deliberate slowly, to sharpen the distinction between *εἰστοχία* and *εὐβουλία* (1142 b 2). Swift-footed counsel, says Lucian (*Pal. anth.* x. 37), drags in its train repentance.¹⁴

It is Theognis who first brings into sharp contrast the workings of chance and deliberation. Hardly any other topic of the literature of counsel looms so large throughout the entire range of discussion of advice and deliberation. Theognis' fuller statement of it (161-64) opposes those who with poor minds enjoy good luck, those for whom what seemed to be going to turn out badly actually comes to a fair conclusion, to those who, on the contrary, toil with good deliberation and wretched luck but fail of any results for their efforts.¹⁵ After Theognis, Herodotus' conservative Artabanus insists that good deliberation is the greatest of boons,¹⁶ and that though a well-deliberated plan meet with some obstacle, it was none the less well deliberated, but must be said to have been defeated by chance (*τύχη*). And he who deliberated badly has but found a prize, if fortune attend him; his plans were laid none the less poorly.

The subsequent developments of the relation of chance and deliber-

¹² See Shorey's note on this passage, *Class. Jour.*, II (1906), 80.

¹³ vii. 49. 5. Further modified forms of Herodotus' sentiment are Demos. xiv. 8; Salust *Cat.* i. 6; Agapetus *Ad Justinian. adhort.* 25; and Bacon, "Of Boldness": ". . . Boldness . . . is ill in counsel, good in execution."

¹⁴ Cf. Democritus, frag. 66 (Diels³), *προβουλευέσθαι κρείσσον πρὸ τῶν πράξεων ἢ μετανοεῖν*; Epicharmus, frag. 41 (*ibid.*, I, 126), *οὐ μετανοεῖν ἀλλὰ προνοεῖν χρητὸν ἀνδρᾶ τὸν σοφόν*.

¹⁵ At 639-40 the thought is varied slightly: "Often the affairs of men come to prosper beyond their expectation and hope, but their plans meet no fulfilment." Here the deliberation was not necessarily poor.

¹⁶ vii. 10. Cf. Hdt. vii. 157; Soph. *Antig.* 1050; and Isoc. ii. 53.

ation fall into three divisions, not always distinct from one another: rhetorical, sententious, and philosophical. The rhetorical begins with Thucydides vi. 23. 3, . . . εἰδὼς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς δεῖν βουλευσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι, and continues with Isocrates' conciliation of chance and deliberation at i. 34, ἡγοῦ κράτιστον εἶναι παρὰ μὲν τῶν θεῶν εὐτυχίαν, παρὰ δ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εὐβουλίαν. At vi. 92 Isocrates makes the distinction that what happens in the field of battle is due to chance, but that what is decided in the deliberative assembly is a sign of the judgment of that body itself. Demosthenes, probably with the general topic in mind rather than this passage of Isocrates, develops the same thought from the point of view of the adviser of an assembly in his plaint that a counselor should not be held responsible for the ultimate result of his advice, but should be judged by his choice of principles under the circumstances.¹⁷ When the outcome is a mixture of success and failure, Demosthenes taxes his opponents with attributing the failure to the counselor and his bad luck, but the success to opportunity.¹⁸ The principal *sententia* on the topic is Chaerephon's line, τύχη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματ', οὐκ εὐβουλία, most of the references to which are collected in Nauck's note upon it.¹⁹ Sometimes the superiority of chance to deliberation is expressed by saying that chance deliberates better than we, notably in a line of the *Μονόστιχοι* (726): ταυτόματον ἡμῶν καλλίω βουλεύεται.²⁰

An exposition of the philosophical discussions of chance and deliberation is beyond the scope of this paper. Beginning with a fragment of Democritus (Diels³, II, 84) to the effect that chance does battle with prudence in a small way, but that intelligent sharp-sightedness guides aright most of the affairs of life; continuing with the playful etymolo-

¹⁷ xviii. 189-92. Cf. i. 16; *exord.* 25; *epist.* v. 5; [Demades] *περὶ Δωδεκαετίας* 15 and 35; Diodor. Sic. xi. 11. 2, *χρὴ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων κρίνειν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως*· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τύχη κυρία, τοῦ δ' ἡ προαίρεσις δοκιμάζεται.

¹⁸ xviii. 212, *τὸν καιρὸν*. Cf. Aeschines iii. 141, and the saying attributed to Bias (Orelli, *Op. Graec.*, I, 184): *Ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ἄριστος σύμβουλος; ὁ καιρὸς, ἔφη*.

¹⁹ *Trag. Graec. frag.*, p. 782. The line serves as the text for Plutarch's essay, *De fortuna*. I may add the use of the line by a scholiast on Eur. *Hecuba* 853: *τύχαι παρ' Ἑλληνσι καὶ αἱ ταπειναὶ τάξεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὑποταγμέναι· καὶ αἱ ὑψηλαί, καὶ ἐπικρατοῦσαι. ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης γὰρ ἐνόμιζον ταῦτα γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐκ ἀπὸ εὐβουλίας τε καὶ κακοβουλίας*. The scholiast is thinking of Arist. *Rhet.* 1390 b 14 (cf. also Ps. Xen. *De venat.* xiii. 9), as in what follows my quotation he is thinking of Arist. *Phys.* 195 b 35 ff. or the doxographer (Diels, *Dox.*, p. 325).

²⁰ Cf. Alciphron *Epist.* iii. 13. 2 and Dio Chrys. lxiv. 12.

gizing of Plato on *τύχη* and *βουλή* in the *Cratylus*,²¹ and the proof in the protreptic discussion of the *Euthydemus* (279 C–280 B) that he who has *σοφία* does not need *εὐτυχία*; the philosophical division of the topic receives its fullest development in the section on the fortunate man in the *Eudemian Ethics* (1247 a ff.). The moral issue raised by Democritus is the subject of Plutarch's *De fortuna*.

In Phocylides, the third of Isocrates' writers of *ὑποθήκαι*, occurs the first instance of a proverbial association of counsel and night: *νυκτὸς βουλεύειν, νυκτὸς δέ τοι δευτέρῃ φρήν / ἀνδράσιν ἡσυχίῃ δ' ἀρετὴν διζημένῳ ἐσθλή*.²² Though there are several forms of the proverb,²³ that which became standard is *ἐν νυκτὶ βουλή*, a form appearing first in Menander. Herodotus vii. 12 offers the first step toward it: *νυκτὶ δὲ βουλὴν διδούς*. This phrase derives from the idiom *λόγον ἐαυτῷ διδόναι*,²⁴ and implies either that the deliberator takes night into his confidence,²⁵ with Euripides' *νυκτὶ συνθακῶν* (*Heracl.* 994), or that he turns counsel over to the night, with our own expressions, "Sleep on it" and "Take counsel of one's pillow."²⁶

The standard form of the proverb, influenced by Herodotus' passage, is approached in Menander's *Arbitrants* (35 f.): *ἐν νυκτὶ βουλὴν δ' ὅπερ ἅπασι γίγνεται, / διδούς ἐμαυτῷ διελογιζόμεν*. It stands alone finally in a line of the *Μονόστιχοι* (150): *ἐν νυκτὶ βουλή τοῖς σοφοῖσι γίγνεται*. Plutarch (*Them.* xxvi. 2) and Julian (*Or.* iii. 122 D) recall Herodotus and Menander, respectively. The paroemiographer paraphrases Phocylides by way of comment.²⁷ Libanius has two rhetorical exercises (viii. 106–7) on Homer's line (B 24), *οὐ χρεὶ παννύχιον*

²¹ 420 C. By establishing the relations, *δόξα—τόξον, οἴησις—οἶσις, βουλή—βολή, and βούλεσθαι—βουλεύεσθαι = ἐφίεσθαι*, Plato finds that both *ἀβουλία* and *ἀνυχία* mean missing something aimed at or wished for or deliberated on or desired. Another curious etymology is given by Eustathius *Ad Hom. "Od."* i. 40. 17–21, *καὶ ἡ βουλή ἐπερθέσει τοῦ ὕ*; and cf. *ibid.* xlii. 6–9, where *συμβουλή* is derived from *συμβολή* by understanding the former to be a picnic of words. Of course, *βούλεσθαι* and *βουλεύειν* are related; cf. Boissacq, p. 129; Schmidt, III, 615 f.; and *Etym. mag.*, s.v. *βούλω*.

²² Epicharmus has the thought, frags. 27 and 28.; Diels³, I, 124.

²³ Another is *νύξ καὶ βουλή*, *Etym. mag.* cccxcix. 50.

²⁴ So Schweighauser, who, however, supplies *ἐαυτῷ* at Hdt. vii. 12, taking *νυκτὶ* as temporal. Liddell and Scott still construe it so (s.v. *νύξ*).

²⁵ So A. C. Merriam, *Hdt., Bks. VI and VII* (New York, 1885).

²⁶ So Baehr (1834) and most editors since.

²⁷ Leutsch, I, 82. Cf. scholion of Tzetzes on Ar. *Frogs* 962 and *Rhein. Mus.*, VI (1848), 616.

εὔδειν βουληφόρον ἄνδρα. Eustathius on the same line²⁸ makes the same points and adds somewhat. Both suppose Homer's line to be a gnome, and, bringing in "counsel in the night," support the proverb by deriving εὐφρόνη from εὐ φρονεῖν.²⁹ Eustathius, moreover, finds a play on this derivation in Euripides' ἤδη πόντ' ἄλλως νυκτὸς ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ / . . . ἐφρόντισα.

Erasmus (*Adag.* 462 B) relates this proverb to the "deliberate slowly" topic. He recognizes the possibility of its meaning either to lie awake and deliberate or to sleep in hopes of a fresher point of view on waking.

A history much like that of "counsel in the night" is that of the proverb *ιερόν συμβουλή*. It first appears in the fragments of Epicharmus, to whom Zenobius (*Leutsch*, I, 96) attributes a line which Kaibel (*Com. Graec. frag.*, p. 131) has reconstructed to read: *ιερόν ἃ συμβουλία ἐστὶ χρῆμα*. Aristophanes used it in his *Amphiaraus*, and Blaydes (*frag.* 37) has conjectures to offer on who said it in the play and under what circumstances. He compares Plato *Ion* 534 B, "A holy thing is a poet," and Polemo (*Athen.* 234 D): ". . . The parasite was something holy." His parallels would be better if we supposed the original proverb to be, "A holy thing is a counselor," a form given only by an inferior paroemiographer³⁰ and by Erasmus. Passages in Xenophon's *Anabasis* (v. 6. 4) and in the pseudo-Platonic *Theages* (122 B) make much of the sacred duty of the adviser to advise honestly. The fifth Platonic epistle refers to it (321 C); Lucian quotes it (*Teacher of Orators* 1); and Julian writes to Libanius (Ep. 3. = 374 C): "Send me your discourse and that 'holy counsel.'" Iamblichus sets it down as a practice of the Pythagorean school "to give no advice but the best to him who consulted them. For holy is counsel."³¹

The commentaries on the proverb agree with Zenobius' interpretation: *ἐπὶ τῷ δεῖν καθαρῶς συμβουλευεῖν*.³² The scholiast on the passage in the *Theages* (Hermann, VI, 287) comments at length to the same purport as the paroemiographer, but adds that "some say the proverb

²⁸ *Ad Hom.* "Il." i. 137. 12 ff. Cf. also Eustath. on *Il.* xviii. 45; *Od.* iii. 138 and xix. 2.

²⁹ So *Etym. mag.* ccxcix. 50 and Cornutus *De natura deorum* 14.

³⁰ *Leutsch* and *Schneidewin*, II, 466.

³¹ *VP* 85 = *Diels*³, I, 359.

³² *Meineke's* emendation (*Philol.*, XII, 612) of the MSS *ἐπὶ τῶν δεινῶν κ. σ.*

conveys praise of counsel. For they take it to mean that counsel is divine and superhuman." This interpretation probably means to object that the proverb has no direct reference to the obligation of an individual to counsel honestly.

Erasmus (424 CD) misquotes the proverb as "*Res sacra consultor*," and, no doubt carelessly expanding the abbreviation "Zen." of a secondary source or of his own notebook, calls the paroemiographer "Zenodotus." At *Theages* 122 B he reads *σύμβουλον*, not recorded elsewhere; and he has the curious sentence: "Suidas indicat dictum ubi deliberatur de rebus periculosis, ut simile videatur illi, *sacram ancoram jacere*." Suidas (s.v. *ιερόν*) had further corrupted the already corrupt text of Zenobius to *ἐπὶ τῶν δεινῶν συμβουλεύειν*. Erasmus possibly saw or found copied in his notebook a *περὶ* in place of *ἐπὶ* and so understood it to mean "to deliberate concerning perilous matters."³³ Erasmus closes his note with a line from the *Μονόστιχοι* (256).

Of the seven sages Thales is credited with having said that it is difficult to know one's self but easy to advise another (Diog. Laert. i. 36). And Solon is assigned the dictum: *συμβούλευε μὴ τὰ ἥδιιστα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄριστα*.³⁴ Isocrates develops this as a topic (*On the Peace* 3 ff.) in a rebuke of the assembly for their failure to bestow their attention impartially on the speakers,³⁵ a failure which he does not find surprising in view of the fact that on all other occasions they have been wont to banish speakers who did not advocate what accorded with their own desires. Much space is given to the topic, the nearest approach to Solon's words being *ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συμβουλευόντων οὐδὲν ἂν πάθοιτε τοιοῦτον* (§ 10). Isocrates again (vii. 57), Demosthenes several times (viii. 1, ix. 3, *exord.* 10), and pseudo-Andocides (*Against Alcibiades* 12) make use of this topic.

Herodotus' *History* abounds in consultations and deliberations, and not a few commonplaces of this division of Greek thought find their best statement in his work. Most of these commonplaces, as I have pointed out in dealing with them individually, are developments of topics whose content antedates Herodotus. To complete the account,

³³ Sturz (*Lex. Xen.*, s.v. *συμβουλή*) carries over this error without comment.

³⁴ Diog. Laert. i. 60. Stob. iii. 115 (Hense) reads *τὰ βέλτιστα*. Cf. Diels², II, 215.

³⁵ The plea for an impartial hearing is a commonplace of deliberative oratory: Isoc. viii. 11; Demos. xv. 1, *οἶμαι δεῖν . . . περὶ τηλικούτων βουλευομένους δίδόναι παρρησίαν ἐκάστῳ τῶν συμβουλευόντων*. Cf. also Demos., *exord.* 3, 10, and 18.

I now consider the few whose first appearance in extant Greek literature is in Herodotus. In the objection of the Spartan heralds to putting themselves in the hands of Xerxes at the advice of the Persian Hydarnes (vii. 135) is implied, at any rate, the idea that a similar kind of experience is necessary before one may advise another in certain fields of conduct. Hydarnes is told that his advice is one sided: he has experienced slavery, but not freedom. Sophocles' fragment (900 P), *ὅς μὴ πέπονθε τ' ἅμᾶ, μὴ βουλευέτω*, approaches the general thought of Herodotus' passage, though the circumstances of adviser and advised are the reverse, and the spirit of the sentiments too removed to make possible any influence of one on the other.³⁶

Another idea of Herodotus, that the advice of a stranger, uninfluenced by the motive of jealousy which might prompt one's fellow-citizen, is likely to be the best counsel he can give (vii. 237), is paralleled by a myth in the *Collection of Aesopean Myths* (46), whose moral is that they who give advice to their neighbors do not give it with good intent but for their own advantage.

In keeping with his treatment of chance and deliberation, Herodotus puts into the speech of the Greek envoys to Gelon the sentiment (vii. 157. 3), *τῷ δὲ εὖ βουλευθέντι πρῆγματι τελευτῇ ὡς τὸ ἐπίπαν χρηστὴ ἐθέλει ἐπιγίνεσθαι*. A fragment of Chaeremon conveys the same thought from a point of view subsequent, instead of prior, to the deliberation and action (26 N): *σφαλεῖς γὰρ οὐδεὶς εὖ βεβουλευσθαι δοκεῖ*.

The praise of good deliberation is implicit in most of the topics of this literature. Greek tragedy, like Herodotus and Pindar,³⁷ presents many an object lesson in the cost of bad counsel and the benefits of good counsel. Stubbornness is contrasted with good counsel in the *Prometheus* (1034 f., 1037 f.). In Euripides' *Suppliants* Theseus reproves Adrastus (161): *εὐψυχίαν ἔσπευσας ἀντ' εὐβουλίας*. And in a stichomythic deliberation in Euripides' *Phoenician Women*³⁸ Eteocles asks

³⁶ More akin to Sophocles' fragment is Alcibiades' use of the story of the man suffering from snake-bite, who refused to describe his experience to any save those who had suffered the same thing (Plato *Symp.* 217 E ff.). Campbell most aptly compares Shaks., *Much Ado about Nothing*, V, i, 6: "Give not me counsel; / Nor let no comforter delight mine ear / But such an one whose wrongs do suit with mine."

³⁷ Cf. Pindar *O.* x. 41 f.

³⁸ Vss. 719-48. Other examples of stichomythia designed to represent a deliberation are Eur. *Iph. in Tauris* 1020-55 and *Electra* 612-75.

Creon whether he will choose generals with a view to their courage or the good counsel of their minds (746).

It is lack of foresight on the part of Creon that precipitates the tragedy of the *Antigone*. Creon's counsels are vain.³⁹ He is stubborn like Prometheus; and it is the part of a fool to be stubborn, says Tiresias, whose good advice (1031-32) is met by Creon with sophistry (1043 ff.). Tiresias praises good deliberation (1050) after Herodotus vii. 10. The chorus too exhort Creon to deliberate well (1098). Appropriately enough, the messenger who reports the tragedy omits any reference at first to the bad counsel of Creon, but, following Theognis, ascribes all to chance. Closing his speech, however, he says that the dead Haemon demonstrates that *ἀβουλία* is the worst evil a man can have. And Creon at last cries out at the unhappiness involved in his counsels (1265), and addresses the body of his son (1268 f.): *ἔθaves, ἀπελὶθης, / ἑμαῖς οὐδὲ σαῖσι δυσβουλίας*. For Haemon, paraphrasing Hesiod (*W. and D.* 293-97; cf. *supra*), had, in spite of his youth, endeavored to advise his father (719 ff.).⁴⁰

Earlier in the play Antigone speaks of her ill counsel (95): *τὴν ἐξ ἐμοῦ δυσβουλίαν*. But she is ill advised only in that she fails to follow the course most expedient to herself. In like manner Athens is called *ἄβουλος* because she espoused the cause of a weaker state now and again, and her *ἀβουλία* in this particular became a topic of praise of her in drama and oratory.⁴¹

Apparently quite distinct from this topic of praise is a major topic of the literature of counsel appearing first in comedy and centered about what was or came to be regarded as a proverbial expression, *δυσβουλία Ἀθηναίων*. This topic is never one of praise, but is always used with reference to the "muddling-through" policy of Athens, her failure to plan ahead carefully, her trusting to luck and having it. The *locus classicus* is *Clouds* 587 ff.: *φασὶ γὰρ δυσβουλίαν / τῇδε τῇ πόλει προσεῖναι· πάντα μέντοι τοὺς θεοὺς / ἅττ' ἂν ὑμεῖς ἐξαμάρτητ' ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον τρέπειν*. The editions of Blaydes, Rogers, and others have gen-

³⁹ V. 753, *κενὰς γνώμας*.

⁴⁰ Haemon's good advice was evidence of good deliberation on his part. Had Creon taken it, he would have shown good deliberation, in that he would have shown ability to follow in his mind the steps in another's deliberation.

⁴¹ Burgess, *Epidictic Literature*, "Studies in Classical Philology," University of Chicago, III (1902), 151, has collected the references to this topic.

erally full notes here. Of the poetical passages the other principal one is in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, where the content of the *Clouds* passage is repeated with the introduction (473): λόγος γέ τοί τις ἐστι τῶν γεραυτέρων. The scholiast on the passage⁴² is the earliest authority for the story that Poseidon in his anger at not being chosen patron of the city fastened upon it the curse of bad deliberation. Athena, unable to lift the curse, negated its effect by tendering the city the gift of having that which was planned badly turn out well. Suidas and the *Mantissa proverbiorum* understand the proverb to have a general application to all who are fortunate unexpectedly and unworthily.⁴³ Several questions arise. To begin with, it is curious that in the many uses of the topic in classical literature there is no reference to the Poseidon and Athena myth, unless the prayer to Pallas Athena at the end of the *Ecclesiazusae* passage is, as Rogers supposes, such a reference. Again, if δυσβουλία 'Αθηναίων was a proverb in classical times, why does it occur in this form only in the *Clouds* passage? May not the proverbial use of it noticed by Suidas and the paroemiographer be the only use of it in that form as a proverb, and does not that use imply its quotation from Aristophanes? How old the commonplace may have been when Aristophanes and Eupolis (frag. 205 K) received it is perhaps idle to conjecture. But I think that it may be a particular application of the larger topic of chance and deliberation, the legend being invented to suit the commonplace.

Thucydides may have had the topic in mind when, at i. 84. 4, Archidamus, speaking to the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, exhorts them to make their preparations on the assumption that their opponents have laid their plans well, and warns them not to build hopes on the possibility that they will make blunders.⁴⁴ In similar vein Isocrates supposes the question asked (viii. 57): How, if the Athenians deliberate so badly, are they secure, and possessed of no less power than any other city? And he replies that their adversaries are as unwise as they.

Greek comedy has a number of curiosities to offer in its topics of counsel. There are, to begin with, the not inconsiderable recommenda-

⁴² Cf. the scholiast on *Ecl.* 473.

⁴³ Suidas, s.v. 'Αθην. δυσ., and Leutsch and Schneidewin, II, 745, have the explanation: ἐπὶ τῶν παρ' ἐλπίδας καὶ ἀναξίως εὐτυχούντων.

⁴⁴ Cf. Thucyd. i. 120. 5, which I discuss in connection with another topic, *infra*.

tions to drink wine while deliberating. In the *Knights* Demosthenes and Nicias pass banter on the subject (86 ff.), the former proposing that they drink the unmixed wine of good fortune: "For perhaps in that way we can reach a happy plan in our deliberation." Nicias objects to *unmixed* wine and asks, "How can a man who is drunk arrive at a happy plan?" There follows an encomium of wine, and finally the command to bring wine, "that I may moisten my wits and say something clever."⁴⁵ Only wine, says a fragment of Antiphanes (18 K), can make a man's boldness overcome his good counsel.⁴⁶ Plutarch (*Quaest. conviv.* 714 A–716 C) and Eustathius (*Ad Hom. "Il."* ii, 240. 31–43), using for a text the deliberative councils of Homer where wine was poured freely (Δ 344 ff. and I 70 ff.), expatiate on the assistance which wine-drinking may lend to deliberation. Both take it to be a Persian custom,⁴⁷ but Eustathius adds that the Persians contrived to be sober when they came to a decision. Plutarch thinks the custom Greek too, and cites among other proofs the epithet *Εύβουλεύς* given Dionysus.⁴⁸ Plutarch's next convivial question (714 D ff.) develops the arguments for and against.⁴⁹

One of the arguments in favor of drinking while deliberating is as follows (715 F): *ἔστι δὲ παρρησίας καὶ δι' αὐτὴν ἀληθείας γονιμώτατος*.⁵⁰ *Περὶ παρρησίας*, the title of one of Stobaeus' chapters, is the name of an essay by the rhetorician Philodemus, in which one division of "frankness" is said to be concerned with the deliberative division of rhetoric, as examples of which are given *μὴ καταχαρίζεσθαι ῥαυδίως παντάπασιν μηδὲ πιστεύειν προχείρως*.⁵¹ The relation of this topic to that of counsel is first found illustrated in an anonymous fragment of comedy (*Adesp.* 355 K): *περὶ μεγάλων γὰρ πραγμάτων σκοποῦμένοις / εὐνοῦσάτη σύμ-*

⁴⁵ Cf. *Lysist.* 1228 ff. and Cratinus, frag. 199 K.

⁴⁶ Plato (*Laws* 674 B) would have no one taste wine who was going to participate in a deliberation of any account.

⁴⁷ Cf. also Plutarchi "*De proverbiis Alexandrinorum*" (Otto Crusius [1887], p. 7, § 10): *Πέρσαι μὲν γὰρ μεθύοντες βουλευόνται*.

⁴⁸ Also given to Zeus (Diod. Sic. v. 72) and to Hades (Cornutus *De nat. deorum* 35), because "he shows good counsel when he makes men to cease from their cares and worries."

⁴⁹ Cf. the remark of Leontychidas at *Apoph. Lac.* 224 D.

⁵⁰ Cf. Eustath. *loc. cit.*, *ῥάγινες τανῶν ἐν οἴνῳ ἔσμεν*, and Plut. *De garrulitate* 503 F.

⁵¹ Philodemus (Teubner), p. 53.

βουλος ἢ παρρησία. But the topic of frankness is more often associated with the larger one of free speech.

Μήποτε λάβης γυναῖκας εἰς συμβουλίαν, says a line of the *Μονόστιχοι* (355). From the same collection another line warns us that "a woman just doesn't deliberate with an eye to the advantageous."⁵² A fragment of Philemon (177 K) agrees: ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς λαμβάνων συμβουλίαν / πεσεῖν δεδοικώς, βούλεται πάλιν πεσεῖν. Aristotle grants woman the deliberative faculty, but adds that it is ἄκυρον. The slave he denies any deliberative faculty at all.⁵³ A fragment of a Freiburg papyrus⁵⁴ presents the objection of a slave to such a low estimate of himself: ἐμοὶ προσανάθον, λαβέ με σύμβουλον πόνων / μὴ καταφρονήσης οἰκέτου συμβουλίαν.⁵⁵

An everlasting adviser is "an Arabian counselor," after the proverb, "an Arabian flute-player," for the endless talker.⁵⁶ Crates of Thebes, a Cynic, puts the lowest-known value upon advice. He would give the counselor smoke for his trouble, in a list of wages for various professions and trades in which the cook fares best (Diog. Laert. vi. 86).

Thucydides' *History* is remarkable for its sage commentaries on, or restatements of, some of the commonplaces of counsel and deliberation. Particularly interesting in this connection is a passage in the speech of the Corinthian envoys at the deliberation of the Peloponnesian allies at Sparta. In favor of war, the point is made that the quickest way of losing the delights of peace is to cling to them in a cowardly manner and to remain inactive in the face of danger. At the same time there is added the warning that to presume on good luck in war is to fail to reflect that one's hopes rest upon an ill-grounded confidence. The sentence following is explanatory, not of the preceding sentiment, but of the frame of mind of those censured in it: "For many ill-advised plans have met with success because they had the luck to deal with adversaries even more ill-advised; and still more plans are there which,

⁵² *Μονόστιχοι* 106: γυνὴ δ' ὅλως τὸ συμφέρον οὐ βουλεύεται.

⁵³ *Politics* 1260 a 12.

⁵⁴ Now assigned to Philemon by K. Fuhr, who emends with the help of Lucian's *Zeus tragoedus* (*Berlin Philol. Woch.*, XXXV, 809).

⁵⁵ Cf. among many parallels pseudo-Cato *Disticha de moribus ad filium* iii. 10: "Utile consilium dominus ne despice servi, etc."

⁵⁶ Menander, frag. 502 (Meineke). Cf. Leutsch and Schneidewin, I, 42, 47, 352; II, 97 and 147.

though they seemed to have been made with sound deliberation, have, on the contrary, ended disgracefully." Thucydides means that it is by observing previous instances of luck in war, by seeing how a well-devised plan failed utterly, that a people becomes inclined to trust to luck, to rely on hopes. The speaker might in fact be an Attic orator addressing the Athenian assembly on the topic, *δυσβουλία Ἀθηναίων* (*supra*). Again, the passage is reminiscent of the warning which Herodotus puts into the mouths of the Greek envoys to Gelon (vii. 157. 3; cf. *supra*). The next and concluding sentence in this passage of Thucydides passes by the parenthetical sentence just preceding it, and returns to a discussion of the frame of mind of people who trust to luck. This last sentence is explanatory too, but the explanation here consists of a broad ethical generalization: "For no one forms a plan and carries out his plan with the same degree of confidence in either process; but while we make fanciful schemes with a feeling of security, we fall short and are fearful when we come to executing them."⁵⁷ Here Thucydides has in mind probably Herodotus' injunction to deliberate fearfully, but to be bold in execution (vii. 49. 5; cf. *supra*). But Herodotus' injunction Thucydides regards as a "counsel of perfection," as it were; and in his rationalization upon the topic in the endeavor to get at the heart of the matter, he discovers that it is just that natural tendency of men to plan with confidence and to carry out their plans with fear in their hearts that makes them prone to trust to luck and to take overmuch stock in examples in the past of the overthrow by chance of that which was attended by all manner of foresight, and of the success of that which was entered upon carelessly and lightly.

Thucydides' account of the deliberations of the assembly which earned for Athenians the name *μετάβουλοι*⁵⁸ contains a succession of similarly keen variations on time-honored topics. Two commonplaces

⁵⁷ As I have translated freely, I quote the text for convenience: *ὁ τε γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὀκνῶν τάχιστα ἂν ἀφαιρεθείη τῆς βραδύτης τὸ περὶ τὸν δι' ὅπερ ὀκνεῖ, εἰ ἡσυχάζοι, ὁ τε ἐν πολέμῳ εὐτυχία πλεονάζων οὐκ ἐντεθιμῆται θράσει ἀπίστω ἐπαιρούμενος. πολλὰ γὰρ κακῶς γινώσκοντα ἀβουλοτέρων τῶν ἐναντίων τυχόντα καταρβώθη, καὶ ἔτι πλεῖν ἢ καλῶς δοκοῦντα βουλευθῆναι ἐς τοῦναντίον αἰσχυρῶς περιέστη· ἐνθυμεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὁμοίᾳ τῇ πιστεῖ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἀσφαλείας μὲν δοξάζομεν, μετὰ δίκους δὲ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐλλείπομεν.* For this type of Thucydidean psychology, cf. Shorey's paper, "Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides," *Transactions of A.P.A.*, XXIV (1893), 66-88, and for the style, *ibid.*, p. 81.

⁵⁸ Ar. *Acharn.* 632. Cf. *ταχύβουλοι* (*ibid.* 630).

of counsel, "deliberate slowly," and one first appearing in a line of Epicharmus,⁵⁹ are brought together in the speech of Diodotus (iii. 42. 1): δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εἰβουλία εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν. The speech proceeds with suggestions for insuring the free speech of counselors (§ 5): No special honors should be given to the counselor whose advice most often proves salutary; no punishment meted him whose advice meets with disapproval. Under the prevailing circumstances, good advice favorably given is under as much suspicion as bad advice (iii. 43. 2). Even so, Athens' advisers must look farther ahead than the assembly, for they are responsible advisers, the assembly irresponsible listeners.⁶⁰

Andocides presents the first instance of a commonplace which later becomes a special division in the treatments of deliberative oratory: the need of keeping past events in mind in order to deliberate well concerning the future.⁶¹ Isocrates restates the thought several times (i. 34-35; ii. 35); it appears in Lysias' *Apology*, § 23, and in pseudo-Lysias' *Epitaphius*, § 6. Plutarch admonishes fathers not to be unmindful of the fact that memory contributes not only to education, but to the conduct of one's life (*Mor.* 9 F). In Aristotle's tripartite division of rhetoric, "examples" are said to be most suitable for deliberative speakers, as amplification for epideictic, and enthymemes for forensic, speakers (*Rhet.* 1368 a 26 ff.).

With Isocrates the possibilities implicit in the commonplaces of counsel are exploited to the full. A section of the address *To Demonicus* (34-35) consists of a succession of such commonplaces, save for the apparently original suggestion that in a matter concerning which one is ashamed to speak out frankly, yet wishes the advice of friends, one may present one's case as if it were another's. The oration *On the Peace* presents elaborate developments of such topics as the "poor counsel of Athens" (§§ 8 ff.), the "best counsel, not the most acceptable" (§ 5), and the opposition of counsel and action as seen in the Athenians' failure to deliberate as if they were not sure of the future,

⁵⁹ Frag. 44 (Diels³, I, 126): οὐδὲ εἰς οὐδὲν μετ' ὀργῆς κατὰ τρόπον βουλευέται. Cf. Μονόστιχοι 415. Antiphon adds slander (*De Herodis nece* 71-72).

⁶⁰ iii. 43. 4: ὑπείθνον τὴν παραινέσιν ἔχοντας. Cf. [Demos.] lxi. 7: ἔτι δ' ἐπικινδυνότερον τὸ συμβουλευεῖν μέλλονθ' αὐτὸν ὑπείθνον τῷ πεισθέντι καταστήσαι.

⁶¹ iii. 2 and 29.

nor to act as they should if they were sure of it (§ 8). Where the comedian Eupolis had complained that Athens elected men generals whom formerly she would not have chosen as wine-inspectors (frag. 205 K), Isocrates charges the Athenians with following in matters of greatest importance counselors whom they distrust so much that they would not elect them generals (§§ 54 f.), men whom in fact they would not consult on their private affairs.

Besides his elaboration of commonplaces, Isocrates has much to say on deliberation of a near-philosophic content. That deliberation is concerned with the contingent (viii. 8); that the good counselor is the good deliberator who manages his own affairs well (i. 35); that the end of deliberation should be the just, not the merely advantageous (vi. 34-37); that as the mind's function is to deliberate, so the body's function is to serve the mind's decisions (xv. 180 ff.)—all these are ideas to be considered rather in relation to the philosophical treatments of deliberation.

Demosthenes, though he avails himself of some of the commonplaces of counsel, as I have indicated here and there, is principally concerned with the larger political topics of the subject. He complains like Isocrates that Athens convinced will not act on its deliberations; that it wishes the most pleasant advice; that, though no one ever proposes a deliberation about the past (xviii. 192), Athens, like the "foreign boxers" whose hands are always where the last blow struck (iv. 40), follows in its deliberations at the heels of events (iv. 39). The counselor who reveals his opinion before the event thus renders himself answerable to those whom he has persuaded, to chance, to opportunity, and to anyone who wishes to criticize him (xviii. 189). For he is judged, unjustly, not by his choice of principles, but by the outcome (xviii. 192).

Few of the topics which I have discussed in this paper occur at all in Plato's works. A greater number are to be found in Aristotle. There is extant no essay of ancient times on the commonplaces of counsel and deliberation, similar to Bacon's essay, "On Counsel." However, there are several lost works listed by Diogenes Laertius, one of which may have been such a collection. The *Περὶ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι*, which Diogenes Laertius assigns to Simon the cobbler (cf. Zeller⁴, II, i, 243), was probably identical with, or similar to, the pseudo-Platonic *Sisyphus*, if the

dialogue or the author may be thought of as having existed.⁶² Among the lost works of Aristotle is listed an essay, *Περὶ συμβουλίας*.⁶³ A citation of Aristotle by the scholiast on Demosthenes *Olynth.* i. 11 (Rose, *Arist. frag.* 135) may, as Rose formerly thought,⁶⁴ refer to this work. The scholiast says: ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ δεῖν τὸν σύμβουλον οὕτω συμβουλεύειν ὥς ἑαυτὸν μέλλοντα κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἐφ' οἷς ποιεῖται τὴν συμβουλήν· τοῖς γὰρ πείθονται μᾶλλον, οὓς ἂν ὁρῶσιν ἐτοίμους ὄντας συμμετέχειν ὧν συμβουλεύειν ἐγνώκασι. While the context of the scholion seems to indicate that the treatise or dialogue was concerned with the symbouleutic division of rhetoric and may thus have contained much that is preserved in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on that subject, the content of the fragment itself points toward its having been a practical handbook on asking and giving advice, with a careful discrimination of the types of questions on which one may wish advice or may expect advice. The title of a dialogue of Aristippus (Diog. Laert. ii. 84), *πρὸς τὸν συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειροῦντα*, is indicative of a like content. I do not suppose that either of these lost dialogues contained an orderly list or discussion of the topics of counsel and deliberation. But they may well have been storehouses from which such a list could be made.

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⁶² I do not find Hobein's arguments for the existence of Simon convincing (Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Simon").

⁶³ Diog. Laert. v. 24 = Rose, *Arist. frag.*, p. 6. Hesychius (s.v. Ἀριστοτέλης = Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 14) gives the title, *περὶ συμβουλῆς*.

⁶⁴ It is so assigned in the "Berlin" *Arist.*, p. 1501a.

LUCAN AND CIVIL WAR

BY EVA MATTHEWS SANFORD

THE old question whether Lucan was a historian or a poet has been largely superseded in these more subjective days by a milder controversy as to the identity of his hero. The popular solutions are familiar enough, but satisfactory chiefly to those who find failure in this essential point of epic consistent with their general conception of Lucan's second-rate quality. Duff argues that Caesar was, despite the poet's intention, the "practical hero of the poem," while Pompey was its "formal" and Cato its "spiritual hero." This is surely a triumvirate from which the Muse of Epic Unity would have averted her face in very shame.¹ Heitland disagrees in part; to him Caesar is again hero *de facto*, and Cato a secondary hero as a model of moral greatness, but Pompey is not a hero in any sense. His final estimate of the question expresses the feeling of numerous other critics:

It is very characteristic of Lucan that it should be necessary to search after the hero at length. And when we have found him, he is a hero not in virtue of the poet's efforts, but in spite of them. This is the Nemesis that follows on an attempt to misrepresent history. Lucan is borne on the stream of declamation without knowing whither it may bear him.²

Another solution approaches more closely to the theme of the present paper. Giraud some years ago called attention to the obsession of the public conscience during the early Empire, by the recollection of the great republicans, Cato and Cicero. Every writer had either to praise or to attack them, as one of the best-known anecdotes of the life of Augustus himself bears witness. Giraud points out that a literary tradition had been formed about the civil wars, which became rooted in Augustan and Julio-Claudian culture. The truth of this suggestion may easily be tested by examination of the list of known titles of lost works dealing with the subject, to some of which Lucan must have owed a debt no longer measurable.

¹ J. Wight Duff, *A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age* (New York, 1927), p. 328.

² W. E. Heitland, Introduction to Haskins, *M. Annaei Lucani "Pharsalia"* (London, 1887), p. lxii.

Giraud thus recognized an essential if fairly obvious point, that epic unity does not demand a single hero, but a single theme, which may or may not be expressed in an individual person. Is Achilles the hero of the *Iliad*? To Giraud, Lucan's hero was the Roman Republic, and his hope "to express with a power hitherto unknown the great idea that for a century had haunted Roman imaginations, the loss of liberty."³

The solution suggested in the last sentence has been discussed more fully in Professor Nutting's recent study of the question, in which *Libertas* is proposed as heroine, contrasted with Caesar as villain.⁴ The present paper had been planned and partly written before this article appeared; the chief reason for supporting another solution than his is based on a different conception of what the epic meant to the poet himself. If the *Pharsalia* was conceived as a prolonged declamation, then "*Libertas*, as an academic theme," was certainly an effective subject, but some of the finest of Lucan's lines point to a theme more than academic, as vital to the Romans of the Empire as to those of the Republic.

A stanza composed shortly after the civil war came to an end, and prophesying foreign wars to come, may suggest something of the lost works that stirred Lucan's imagination:

audiet civis acuisse ferrum,
quo graves Persae melius ferirent,
audiet pugnas vitio parentum
rara iuventus.⁵

The younger generation "reduced in numbers by their elders' fault"—the phrase brings the weakening effect of civil war into sharp contrast with the glories of a war by which Persians should be efficiently reduced for the profit of Rome. Gregory of Tours, centuries later, wrote in his history of a nation all too prone to internecine strife: "*Scrutamini diligenter veterum scripta, et videbitis quid civilia bella parturiant.*"⁶ His reference was to Orosius, but Orosius would have re-

³ "Un poète républicain," *Revue des deux mondes*, X (1878), 423-44; the points cited above are found on pp. 424-25 and 427.

⁴ H. C. Nutting, "The Hero of the *Pharsalia*," *American Journal of Philology*, LIII (1932), 41-52.

⁵ Horace *Carmen* i. 2. 21-24, dated by J. Elmore in *Class. Phil.*, XXVI (July, 1931), 260, as composed in the latter part of the year 30 B.C.

⁶ *Historia Francorum*, Preface to Book v.

ferred the phrase to Lucan. Remembering the first line of the *Iliad*, and its contrast with Vergil's "arms and *the man*," consider Lucan's opening words:

Bella per Emathios plusquam civilia campos,
iusque datum scelerei canimus. . . .⁷

The repetition of the theme throughout lines 1-7, so often censured, seems due to the poet's anxiety to make clear his theme. Mediaeval commentators, as has been pointed out elsewhere,⁸ explain the substance or *materia* of the epic as "the civil war and whatever arose therefrom," or as *totus cesar et totus pompeius*, interpreted by the civil strife between them. And its *intentio* is regularly stated as "to describe the civil war and to dissuade the Romans from civil wars by showing the misfortunes on both sides." Sometimes they suggest also that he sought to warn his contemporaries against the sedition even then brewing against Nero's tyranny.

It not frequently happens that the mediaeval commentator whose detailed notes on any author may be full of puerile-seeming errors, and a far more deadly tedium, prove their kinship with the classical tradition they so intimately knew and loved by a clear comprehension of the whole that offsets their purblind view of the parts. At any rate, their almost unanimous recognition of the civil war as the theme that gave unity and purpose to Lucan's epic seems to show more appreciation of the poem itself than the arguments about factual and spiritual heroes.

Not only was the Roman fate summed up in the civil wars, but, as Sidonius pointed out, the war between Caesar and Pompey, as Lucan told it, was made to seem a greater loss to Rome than all her former losses.⁹ *Bellum plusquam civile* became enshrined as a regular category, and Isidore's definition with direct reference to Lucan was echoed not only by later encyclopedists, but by many diligent scribes in their

⁷ A greater poem has given rise among some critics to a similar controversy, but why should anyone argue whether Lucifer is, in despite of Milton's will, the hero of an epic that begins "Of man's first disobedience"?

⁸ Material on this point from the *accessus* and glosses in various MSS, as well as from separate commentaries, is cited in an article, "The Manuscripts of Lucan: *Accessus* and *Marginalia*," to be published in *Speculum* during 1933. I have, therefore, merely summarized its general tenor here.

⁹ *Carmen* ix. 230 ff.

glosses on the poem. The interpretation by Alain de Lille would have been as well applied to Roman as to sacred history:

Et notandum quod, sicut in auctoribus est multiplex bellum,
ita et in theologia secundum diversos diversorum afflictus.

Exterum, quod fit inter Ierusalem et Babyloniam; *intestinum*,
quod fit inter proximum et proximum, quod dicitur civile; et
plusquam civile, quod fit inter corpus et animam.¹⁰

So the war between Caesar and Pompey was waged indeed between the body and soul of the Roman state, and to lovers of the Roman past it seemed that the body could recover more readily than the soul.

In the light of this general conception, the apparent inconsistencies in Lucan's "heroes" tend to disappear. Caesar is hated as the conspicuous aggressor in the war, as the champion of a new and non-republican era, but that is no occasion for belittling his energy and prowess. The picture of an essentially great man, capable of great deeds for the state, but turned from them by lust for war, who "rejoices at leaving no road unstained by bloodshed," suited the poet's purpose better than any spiteful belittling of his genius could have done. And Pompey's great deeds in civil life and in foreign wars (for his participation in earlier civil warfare came in his youthful days) leave him but the shadow of a name in the face of the new scourge of intestine wars worse than civil. That Cato's praises find less contradiction is due to his refusal to champion the cause either of Caesar or of Pompey in itself, or any save that of the Republic alone:

tantone novorum
proventu scelerum quaerunt, uter imperet urbi?
vix tanti fuerat civilia bella movere,
ut neuter.¹¹

The causes of the war, and especially the great personal causes, Caesar and Pompey, were futile and trivial after all, compared with the war itself:

quemque suae rapiunt scelerata in proelia causae.¹²

No single quotation, or even any moderate number of lines selected for the purpose, can demonstrate the extent to which the theme of the horror of civil war underlies the poem. It is necessary to read it

¹⁰ *Distinctiones dictionum theologicarum*, ed. Migne, in *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. CCX, s.v. "Bellum."

¹¹ *Bellum civile* ii. 60-63.

¹² *Ibid.* 251.

through, feeling significant lines in their context. Certain verses, however, may be chosen to suggest the general tenor of his thought. But there are two points to be emphasized first, in connection with popular criticism, not with any desire to claim for Lucan a sheer poetic genius that, save for some inspired moments, he lacked, but to defend the technique of which his age was undoubtedly a far more capable critic than ours. Had he conceived of Pompey or Cato, or even the Roman Senate, as the theme and hero of his epic, he was quite capable of using his *sententiae* clearly to that end. The frequency with which critics confuse the book they themselves would like to have written with that the author has produced does not validate their method, nor is any modern definition of epic unity properly retroactive. It is perhaps as well for Lucan's rather shaky reputation for historical accuracy that he did not try to set up a consistent hero for the events of the civil war. Many of those very inaccuracies which lay his work open to serious criticism from the historian's point of view become far less grave when the details are considered not as part of a historical narrative of the wars, but as part of the setting for a general study of the evils of civil war as exemplified by its latest and most ruinous example.

The major difficulty in the way of this thesis would seem to be the remoteness of Lucan's age from any real danger of civil war, unless we accept the idea that opposition to Nero was already increasing to such proportions that a "dissuasion from civil war" again seemed timely and necessary. The outbreak of rebellion so shortly after Lucan's death may well have increased the impression made by his poem, but his convictions seem too deeply rooted to be due to this alone.

He wrote nearly ninety years after the end of the civil wars, when the *pax augusta* had made the world safe for Roman imperialism, and a clear frontier had been established for the single empire that had been the aim of wars and diplomacy in the Mediterranean world for centuries, and was to remain the basis of Mediterranean civilization for centuries more. Why should he have grown up with so strong a sense of the ruin wrought by internal warfare?

maius ab hac acie quam quod sua saecula ferrent
volnus habent populi: plus est quam vita salusque
quod perit: in totum mundi prosternimur aevum.
vincitur his gladiis omnis quae serviet aetas.¹³

¹³ *Ibid.* vii. 638-41.

Much of this feeling of the endless consequences of the war may have come from reading contemporary and Augustan accounts, and picturing them with an imagination sharpened by the contrast of generations of internal peace and safely distant wars, which made the imminent peril of revolution the more to be averted, as it was the more inconceivable. Something must have been due to the tradition of senatorial hostility to the Julio-Claudian emperors, which served to keep the civil wars and the lost Republic before men's minds long after the war generations had died out, as Tacitus was later to testify. Whatever the origin of Lucan's obsession with the subject, the civil war that broke out three years after his death was to justify his fears and warnings only too well, and civil wars were to be for centuries, in varying scale, a dominant concern of the Empire.

The war of which he wrote was on a scale that justifies comparison with the war of our recent past, and was in many ways far more akin to it in scope and in combatants than other ancient conflicts. How deep the likeness goes, obscuring the immense differences of weapons and transport, is seen in the striking similarities between Lucan's reactions to the horrors, not so much of the actual carnage, as of the inner workings of the war on the body and soul of the Empire. There is an accidental touch of sheer historical irony in the description of Caesar's march through Northern Italy (i. 255-57) which provided the famous phrase *furor Teutonicus* for later men, from Priscian through the Middle Ages to Petrarch, Bismarck, and the much-disputed Louvain inscription.

Lucan wrote of war a century past, as many of the present generation are writing of a war begun less than a score of years ago. How he recaptured so authentic a feeling and how his pampered literary life afforded such insight is impossible to determine. Certainly his use of Livy and Caesar and the other historians we know cannot explain it. His "road to Emathia" may not be traced, however scholars argue about the sources of his accounts of army movements and tactics, but it may be understood in the light of our own contemporary reactions to the aftermath of war.

How far this conflict diverged from the set Roman conception of war as a source of glory is shown in Curio's speech:

usque adeo miserum est civili vincere bello?¹⁴

¹⁴ *Ibid.* i. 366

to which Lucan's whole work is an affirmative answer. The problem of war guilt is suggested not only by the bitter summary of the causes of the war, open and concealed, ending

hinc usura vorax avidumque in tempore fenus
et concussa fides, et multis utile bellum,¹⁵

but by the words of Caesar himself:

nulla manus, belli mutato iudice, pura est.¹⁶

A similar conception is stated more fully in the first book, with the added idea of the impossibility of stopping a civil war once begun:

imminet armorum rabies; ferrique potestas
confundet ius omne manu: scelerique nefando
nomen erit virtus: multosque exhibit in annos
hic furor. et superos quid prodest poscere finem?¹⁷

The conception of the "lost generation" recurs frequently, as in the soldiers' plea for return after Pompey's death—*perierunt tempora vitae*.¹⁸ The speech of Vulteius in the fourth book has its parallels with the verses of Allan Seeger, Rupert Brooke, and other recent poets.¹⁹

The demoralizing sense of the utter loss of personal security in a ruined world is clearly conceived in Brutus' words to Cato:

pacemne tueris
inconcussa tenens dubios vestigia mundo?

and in the contrast between the anxieties of the living and the peace of the fallen soldier:

felix, qui potuit mundi nutante ruina
quo iaceat iam scire loco.²⁰

His intimate realization of the evils wrought by civil strife naturally did not lead Lucan to any general denunciation of war. The victories of Rome over barbarians were a totally different matter, remote from his inner anxieties. Did any classical writer before Orosius suggest the reverse side of victories in *externa bella*? And even against the recurrence of civil wars, an epic poem was too frail a defense to work on the minds of men of action and ambition.

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¹⁵ *Ibid.* 181-82.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* ix. 233.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* vii. 263.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* iv. 476-520.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* i. 666-69.

²⁰ *Ibid.* ii. 247-48, with which cf. ii. 286-90, and iv. 393-94.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

NOTE ON VERGIL AND SOUTH AFRICA

It is part of Vergil's universal genius that men at all times find a message in him; it is true that the qualities Vergil describes in the early Roman farmer are to some extent common to all rural communities, yet a South African may be pardoned for finding special points of contact both in the spirit of Vergil and in the descriptions of the *Georgics*.

To one who has lived in the cape peninsula the climate, the scenery, and the plants are strongly reminiscent of Italy and Sicily. The oxen that are used for plowing, the way in which the fields are irrigated, are obvious points of comparison. And there are more particular points. At *Georgics* i. 295 Vergil depicts the farmer making torches by the fire, while his wife boils the grape-juice on the fire and scums the surface of the bubbling copper caldron with leaves. This passage has been misunderstood. Mr. Page refers to it as a mode of making wine, Ramsay calls the result a jelly, Plessis and Lejay explain it as a *vin cuit*. But to the cape farmer it is very familiar. It is called by him *moskonfyt* (i.e., *mustu, confectum*) and is, of course, what was known as *defrutum*, described by Pliny the Elder and others (cf. my article, *Class. Rev.*, XLI, 122) and used partly as a syrup and partly to break down the acidity of wines.

Again, the method of settling the quarrels of the bees by scattering a handful of dust (*pulveris exigui iactu*) was practiced by the colored servants on many a cape farm; and when Vergil says that stubble may be best cut by night for then "there is no lack of clammy moisture" (*G.* i. 290), the remark of the South African farmer that the left hand that grasps the brittle stalks becomes very sore and that moisture proves an alleviation in this respect may well contain more truth than the textbook explanation that moisture prevents the sickle from slipping.

But there is more. The Republican Roman was a citizen soldier, commanded in time of war like the Boers of the South African republics, and like him imbued with that northern *gravitas* that made him stress the unity of the family, moral discipline, the undesirability of dancing for amusement or of theatrical performances. In both cases we find that the *paterfamilias* has wide powers, that he is a brave and resourceful fighter, that he has a natural gift for sustained oratory, that he inclines to didacticism, that (in spite of popular views about the Boers) he has a deep-seated respect for law and order, albeit the Boer inherited more individualism from the Hollander than the Roman inherited from the Greek. In both cases too, there is a caustic wit that springs from the soil, and that does not entirely abrogate a certain hardness and formalism.

In a word, while the Roman in his outlook on life was *anima naturaliter Stoica*, the Voortrekker was *anima naturaliter Calviniana*, and between Calvinism and Stoicism there are many points of contact. (Cf. my *Vergil in the Experience of South Africa*, chap. iii.)

Finally, as Vergil represents the fine flower of racial and cultural co-operation in Italy, so he may become a beacon light for those who are involved in racial problems at the present time.

T. J. HAARHOFF

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JOHANNESBURG

ON A SUPPOSED PSEUDO-ARISTOTELIAN TREATISE ON THE SOUL

Ernest Renan in the *Journal asiatique* (XIX [4^e sér., 1852], 330 ff.) called attention to a "treatise of Aristotle on the soul" contained in an ancient Syriac manuscript in the British Museum (No. 14658) and apparently translated from the Greek by Sergius of Rēsh-ʿain. He remarks (pp. 330 f.): "Ce n'est pas, comme on pourrait le croire, une traduction du *περὶ ψυχῆς*, mais un traité divisé en cinq questions dont voici le début. ..." He proceeds to quote the Syriac. W. Wright, in his article on Syriac literature in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (p. 834a), makes a similar statement, as does R. Duval in his *Littérature syriaque* (p. 255). The latest historian of Syriac literature, Dr. Anton Baumstark, speaks of this work (*Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, p. 168) as "eine im griechischen Original nicht erhaltene Aristoteles zugeschriebene Schrift *περὶ ψυχῆς*," and refers to Wright's *Catalogue of the Syriac Manuscripts in the British Museum*, Part III, page 1157. Renan (*loc. cit.*) and Wright (*Cat.*, p. 1157) have given Syriac extracts of the opening lines of the work. If their text be compared with that of a "Discourse of a Philosopher about the Soul" printed in Mrs. A. S. Lewis' *Catalogue of the Syriac Mss. in the Convent of S. Catharine on Mt. Sinai* (pp. 19-26), it will be found that the two are almost identical.¹ Those unacquainted with Syriac can reach a similar conclusion by comparing Renan's version of the British Museum text (*loc. cit.*) with Ryssel's German version of the Sinai manuscript (*Rh. Mus.*, LI [1896], 4 ff.). Renan has:

Tout ce qui est est perçu par les sens, ou atteint par la raison. Ce qui tombe sous les sens donne de soi une parfaite connaissance. ...

Ryssel has:

Alles, was ist, wird entweder durch die sinnliche Wahrnehmung erkannt, oder es wird durch den Verstand vorher erfasst. Das aber, was unter die sinnliche Wahrnehmung fällt, giebt vollständig den Nachweis seines Begriffes, etc.

After the publication of his translation, Ryssel discovered the original Greek in a treatise of Gregory Thaumaturgus entitled *Λόγος κεφαλαιώδης περὶ*

¹ Mr. J. E. Dean, of the University of Chicago, has assisted me in this comparison.

ψυχῆς πρὸς Τατιανόν (*Rh. Mus.*, LI [1896], 318–20). Dräseke attempted to prove this an authentic work of Gregory's in an article in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie* (XLIV [1901], 87–100). His arguments are controverted by Bardenhewer (*Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, II, 283 f.). Both failed to notice that the work is also found, with a few modifications and accretions, under the name of Maximus Confessor, and is so published in Migne, Volume XCI, columns 353 ff. In the fifth and latest volume of Bardenhewer's *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* (1932), page 32, Maximus on the soul is discussed as an independent work, although J. Lebreton had shown in 1906 (*Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique*, 1906, pp. 73–83) that the works were the same. It is to be hoped that the information conveyed by Lebreton and the identification here made of pseudo-Aristotle will find their way into future manuals of church history.

As the British Museum manuscript containing Sergius' translation consists largely of translations of Aristotle and Aristotelian matter done by the same hand, it is not difficult to explain how the treatise, which we may suppose to have been anonymous, as in the Sinai Syriac manuscript and the two oldest and best of Lebreton's Greek manuscripts (*op. cit.*, p. 75), came to be assigned to Aristotle.

BENEDICT EINARSON

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MAXIMUS PLANUDES AND PLATO *PHAEDRUS* 245 C–246 A

In a recent study of Maximus Planudes' translation of the *Somnium Scipionis*, I found that the famous passage translated from *Phaedrus* 245 C–246 A by Cicero had not been retranslated into Greek by Planudes, but that he had here evidently inserted the original passage from his copy of Plato. Since this constitutes a testimonium hitherto, as far as I know, unnoted, a collation with the Oxford text may be of interest. The Planudes text is that of Cod. Laur. Ashburnhamensis 1641, which I recently transcribed.

245 c 7 δὴ] δέ; αὐτὸ] αὐτὸ *cum* B; d 1 ἀγένητον] ἀγώνητον; d 2 ἐκ του] ἐαυτοῦ; d 3 ἐτι ἀρχὴ] ἐξ ἀρχῆς *cum* B T Simplicius Stobaeus; ἐπειδὴ δὲ] ἐπεὶ δέ; ἀγένητον] ἀγώνητον; d 4 ἀνάγκη] ἀνάγκην; d 7 αὐτὸ αὐτὸ] αὐτὸ αὐτὸ *cum* B; d 8 ἡ] καί; e 1 πᾶσαν] καὶ πᾶσαν; γῆν ἐν] γένησιν *cum* B T Hermias Syrianus Stobaeus; e 2 ἔχειν] ἔχειν στήναι *cum* B T; e 6 ἐαυτοῦ] αὐτοῦ; 246 a 1 ἀγένητον] ἀγένητον.

It is evident that Planudes' text most closely followed that of the Clarkianus (B) with a few minor but interesting variants of its own.

WARREN E. BLAKE

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"EPONYMOUS PRIESTS UNDER THE PTOLEMIES"

In his article, "Eponymous Priests under the Ptolemies" (*Studies Presented to F. Ll. Griffith* [London, 1932], pp. 16 ff.), Herbert Thompson suggests (p. 28, No. 50) the following Greek equivalents of the priest names found in a Demotic document (Brit. Mus. 10594, unpublished) dated in the ninth year of Philometor, 172 B.C.: priest of Alexander, Appollodoros, son of Zenon; athlophoros, Kalanta(?), daughter of Komanos; kanephoros, Sarapias, daughter of Apollonios; priestess of Arsinoe Philopater, Eirene, daughter of Ptolemaios.

An unpublished Greek papyrus, bearing the inventory number 1717 in the University of Michigan collection, is dated in the same year and gives a full list of priests, reading as follows: ἐφ' ἱερέως Ἀπολλοδώρου τοῦ Ζήνωνος Ἀλεξάνδρου κτλ., ἀθλοφόρου Βερενίκης Εὐεργέτιδος Κλεαινέτης τῆς Κομανοῦ, κανηφόρου Ἀρσινόης Φιλαδέλφου Σαραπιάδος τῆς Ἀπολλωνίου, ἱερείας Ἀρσινόης Φιλοπάτορος Εἰρήνης τῆς Πτολεμαίου. Thus Thompson's sound judgment is confirmed inasmuch as he has gone astray only in the case of the athlophoros, whom the Michigan document proves to have been Kleainete and not Kalanta, as hazarded by Thompson from his Demotic papyrus.

MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR

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ON THE *EROTIKOS* OF LYSIAS IN PLATO'S *PHAEDRUS*

The debate on the authenticity of the speech attributed to Lysias in the *Phaedrus* long since reached a deadlock—the one side arguing that Plato could imitate any style, the other affirming that he would not have exercised his criticism of Lysias upon an invention of his own. A possibly new argument is the evidence of conscious parody in the use of the particles.

The combination καὶ μὲν δὴ is a somewhat mechanical formula for introducing heavily items or points in an argument. It occurs rarely if at all before the orators and Plato. For Homer cf. editors on *Il.* xviii. 362. I have not noticed it in Herodotus, though μὲν δὴ is very frequent there. Aristophanes has it at least once. I have observed no cases in tragedy, though Euripides has καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ three times and Aristophanes once. For Thucydides compare Spratt and Poppo and others on iii. 113. I have noticed some five cases in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. Isocrates yields to a hasty survey about ten cases, most of them καὶ μὲν δὴ καί. Antiphon and Andocides seem to have two cases each. According to the Index of Preuss, the Demosthenic corpus offers but one case and that καὶ μὲν δὴ καί, in the spurious *Erotikos*. Aristotle, according to Eucken, does not use it. Lysias has about twenty-one cases in 231 pages of Teubner text, and three cases comparatively near together in xiv. 32, 34, 43. Plato, according to my observation, uses it sparingly in comparison with Lysias: once in the *Lysis*, 206 B; once in the *Hippias Major*, 298; once in the

Symposium, 197 A; once in the *Meno*, 88 D; once in the *Protagoras*, 315 C; once in the *Cratylus*, 428 A; twice in the *Gorgias* (καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ), 458 D, 507 B; once in the *Sophist*, 217 B; once in the *Politicus*, 287 D; once in the *Laws*, 712 E; twice in the *Timaeus*, 18 C and 20 C; five times or more in the *Republic*, 406 A, 409 B, 464 B, 528 D, 526 B; once in the *Phaedo*; and once in the *Charmides*.

I am not attempting an exhaustive statistic, and there may be a few other cases. But they will not be numerous enough to affect my argument based on the fact that the speech attributed to Lysias in the *Phaedrus* has five cases within two Stephanus pages, 231 D, 232 B, 232 E, 233 D, 233 E. This can hardly be accident. It is evidently a caricature of this mechanical feature of Lysias' style, resembling Anatole France's amusing imitation of Ferdinand Brunetière's fondness for *car*. The speech, then, is not a speech of Lysias incorporated in Plato's work, but is Plato's own composition.¹

¹ Possible parallels in Plato are the parodies of Prodicus' use of μὲν γὰρ in *Protagoras* 337 and the frequency of δοκῶ and γάρ in the speech of Eryximachus in the *Symposium*. Weinstock (*De Erotico Lysiaco*) thinks there is no parody, but he does not mention καὶ μὲν δὴ.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Greek-English Lexicon. Compiled by HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL and ROBERT SCOTT. A new edition revised and augmented throughout by HENRY STUART JONES with the assistance of RODERICK MCKENZIE. Part VI: λ-οι. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932.

The latest *Heft* of the new Liddell and Scott confirms the judgment that the work is to be an indispensable tool for scholars such as no other language possesses, but that there will be needed at once for students a more conveniently usable *editio minor* or rather *media*. Such an edition should restore the separate headings for every word, and economize mainly by omission of most of the later inscriptional and papyrus material that is found only in *biblia abiblia*. It should not simplify overmuch however. It should retain a sufficiency of illustration with citation of chapter and verse and most of the improvements in respect of technical terms of rhetoric philosophy and the sciences. But alchemy and astrology could safely be omitted.

The limitations of my criticism have already been indicated.¹ I note again many corrections of errors or deficiencies in the older edition, e.g., s.v.: λαμπάδιον, λείπεσθαι ἀπό, λεσχηνευτής, λύσιμος, λύσις, μακράν, μέγα ἔργον, μέθοδος, μελετᾶν δόξας, μελέτη θανάτου, μεσιτεία, μεταβολή, μυῖα, νεαροπρεπής, νόμος, νυκτεγερσία, ξένος.

Perhaps the two most important articles in this part are μέν and λόγος. A treatise could be given to either word, and criticism of what any particular reviewer deems deficiencies might be thought captious. I merely note as interesting me under μέν that the μέν of pious concession, Plato *Symp.* 180 E, and the μέν γάρ in discriminating synonyms, *Protag.* 337, are overlooked; that the μέντοι of trying to remember, Aristoph. *Clouds* 787, is classified as "impatience," and that the monitory μέντοι is not mentioned. The article λόγος fills nearly six close-packed columns. It is an invaluable collection of passages, but will confuse the tiro. There is no attempt to follow the historical development of the word, and the logical order is obscure. But it is easier to criticize any classification of such a mass of material than it is to suggest a better one. ἔξωτεριοὶ λόγοι are summarily defined as "outside the Lyceum." In Plato *Protag.* 344 B, ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον is hardly "maintain a thesis"; ὁ λόγος οὕτω αἰρείει is oddly rendered "analogy proves." Plato *Phaedo* 99 E is as usual misinterpreted. *Cratyl.* 385 C is not cited, I think, for λόγον μέρος or μόριον. There is, I think, no mention of the idiomatic juxtaposition λόγος μάτην.

I add a few suggestions on points about which it seems to me that difference

¹ Cf. *supra*, XXVII (1932), 177-78; XXV (1930), 82-83; XXI (1926), 263 and 365.

of opinion is permissible: *μηδὲν μέτριον*, *Theaet.* 181 B, "nothing accurate." Campbell's "nothing worth our reception" is more nearly right. *διὰ μνήμης ἔχειν* should be added from *Diog. L. x. 12*, and *μετουσιαστικῶς* from *Spengel, Rhet.*, III, 208, 21. *μεταδιορισμός* is a *vox nihili*, taken from the text of *Ruelle's Damascius*, where it is a mistaken emendation. The manuscript, *τοῦ μετὰ διορισμοῦ*, can be construed and is supported by numerous passages in the Aristotelian commentators, e.g., *Simpl. in Cat.* 28. 5; *Alex. in An. Pri.* 36. 26, 140. 18, *τὸ μετὰ διορισμοῦ*; 140. 21, 180. 1, 201. 22. *κατὰ μετριάσμον* is rendered after *Stephanus* "in jest." In very late Greek (e.g., in *Nicetas Chroniata*, p. 410. 24; 416. 12 [ed. Bonn]) *μετριάζω* did take on that meaning. But it is probably derived from playful or ironical litotes, which is the meaning in the *Suidas* passage and in the scholia on *Aristoph. Wasps* 64. *νεκροστολῶν* in *Lucian Charon* 24 does not mean "ferrying" but "escorting the dead." The speaker is *Hermes*. The colloquial use of *μοχθηρός* is neglected (cf. *Hardie, Lectures*, p. 177; *Aristoph. Thesm.* 781). *νοερός* and *νοητός* are much improved, but still, I think, inadequate. In 1135 a, *ἐκαίνισας* is read in *Choeph.* 492 with no warning that it is *Conington's* emendation. Under *καινίζω* the reading is *ἐκαίνισαν*. *μεταβατικός* omits the application to the *σύνδεσμος* δέ in the scholia in *Dionys. Thrac.* lxii.8. In *Theophrast. Char.* 2, I still think that *ὡς μαλακῶς ἐσθλείς* refers to ill health or loss of appetite and not to the daintiness of the fare. In *Max. Tyr.* xi.3 *μετανοητικός* does not mean "given to repentance," but "apt to change his opinions." *τὸ μεταλαμβάνόμενον*, *Ar. An. Pri.* 41 a 39, is now, in acceptance of my criticism (*AJP*, X, 460), translated "substituted" instead of "changed." But the editors still take it of a proposition and not, as I argued, of a term.

PAUL SHOREY

The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, Vol. I. By ROBERT J. BONNER, PH.D., LITT.D., and GERTRUDE SMITH, PH.D. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930. Pp. viii+390. \$4.00.

A study of the administration of justice in ancient Greece has been long awaited by historical and classical students. For those who approach the subject through the medium of English the need of a fresh synthesis has been especially great. Hitherto information had to be gleaned chiefly from the introduction to *Lipsius' comprehensive work*, from *Hommel's admirable monograph*, and from numerous and often inaccessible articles in the learned journals.

This need the present work aims to supply. Professors Bonner and Smith have, except in chapters i and iii, set forth the chronological development of the administration of justice at Athens. In the book they have incorporated the conclusions reached in their own valuable and extensive studies, and have utilized and generously acknowledged the work of other scholars in the field.

Certain points call for especial commendation. The first chapter, "The

Heroic Age," presents a clear summary of the legal ideas and practices that prevailed in the societies depicted in Homer and Hesiod. The treatment of the *ephetai* is fully convincing to the present reviewer. Considered as a whole, the chapter on the reforms of Solon is perhaps most notable for sureness of touch and for skill in the use of fragmentary evidence.

There are other matters, however, with which a reviewer might quarrel. The book is entitled *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*. What we have in fact is, with the exception of chapters i and iii, the history and description of the judicial process at Athens. Perhaps we shall find in the promised second volume a treatment of the administration of justice, so far as it can be reconstructed, that prevailed in other Greek city-states. Perhaps it is unfair for this reason to feel surprise that in the present volume there is no adequate discussion of the Gortynian code or of the legal rules laid down in Plato's *Laws* or of the relationship of these rules to the practices of fourth-century Greece.

Some details of treatment one might call in question. We hardly need, at this date, fifteen pages (pp. 134-48) to prove the unhistorical character of the constitution attributed by Aristotle to Draco. At times the authors seem to underestimate the importance of economic motives in legal development. What, for example, were the "new demands of the times" (p. 81) that brought about the codification of laws in the seventh century? This failure seems particularly clear in the chapter of the reforms of Cleisthenes. That the functions of the *dikasteria* were greatly enlarged "in or near the year 487-486 B.C." (p. 224) may very well be true. But before we can accept this conclusion, we should have better proof than the authors supply that the economic development of Athens then made such a change natural or necessary. Finally, the description of the procedure that was followed in operating the *dikasteria* in Aristotle's time (pp. 375 ff.) is neither sufficiently detailed nor sufficiently clear, except for readers who do not need the description at all.¹

¹ Apparently the description contains one specific error, though the compression of the treatment tends to conceal (unintentionally) the slip. On p. 376 we read: "Each juror brought his *πινάκιον* and cast it into the chest marked with his section letter. Then twice as many were drawn as were needed for jury service on that day. The *πινάκια* thus drawn were attached in some manner to a *καρονίς*. After the requisite number had been drawn, the archon drew dice for the final selection. There were two dice, one black and one white, for each five *πινάκια*. If the archon drew a black die, the first five *πινάκια* from each *καρονίς* were returned to their owners, who were rejected. If he drew a white die, the first five were accepted and so on in order as he drew the dice." In Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 64. 3 the Greek seems to convey a slightly different meaning: "There are bronze dice, black and white. As many white dice, in the ratio of one [die] to five [*πινάκια* or *dikastai*], as there are *dikastai* to be selected, are put into [a container], and similarly [i.e., one die for every five *dikastai* not needed] with the black dice." Now let us assume that on a given day five hundred *dikastai* would be needed. I understand the passage in Aristotle to mean that on such a day one hundred white dice would be used in selecting *dikastai* from all the *καρονίδες*. Similarly, there would be used a number of black dice equal to one-fifth of the number of *πινάκια* left when the number of *dikastai*

These faults, which have been given undue prominence, hardly detract at all from the merits of an interesting and scholarly book that reflects great credit both on the authors and on the University of Chicago Press.

STANLEY BARNEY SMITH

BOWDOIN COLLEGE

New Chapters in the History of Greek Literature: Third Series. By J. U. POWELL. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933. \$4.25.

This third volume of the series will, like its predecessors,¹ instruct the *indocti* and save the *periti* an immense amount of time and trouble in remembering. The names of the contributors are a guaranty of the quality of the work. It would be interesting to compare Mr. C. M. Bowra on early lyric and elegiac poetry with the more daring methods of J. M. Edmonds in the Loeb *Lyra Graeca*. But space fails. Mr. Bowra quotes in Greek and translation most of the more important new fragments of Sappho, Alcaeus, Corinna, Ibycus, Archilochus, and Tyrtaeus. He is especially full and interesting on the paeans of Pindar.

More than a third of the book is given to the chapter on tragedy of Dr. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, who writes with the abundance of knowledge and the parsimony of conjecture that we expect from the author of *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*.² He too quotes freely, and readers who are not specialists can learn from his pages all that they need to know of the story of Telephus in Sophocles and Euripides, of Sophocles' Niobe and Tantalus, of the Ichneutai,³ of stories of twins in Greek plays, of Euripides' Antiope, Hypsipyle, Sthenoboea, Alexandros, and Phaëthon, of which a beautiful chorus on the dawn motif (of Hesiod, of Tennyson's *In Memoriam*) may now be read almost entire, and of the *Peirithous*, the author of which he thinks is more likely to be Critias.

Comedy is treated briefly by Mr. M. Platnauer, who discusses among other things the Pasquali fragments of Menander.

needed on that day is subtracted from the whole number of jurors depositing their *πινάκια* on that day. If the entire panel deposited their *πινάκια*, there would be eleven hundred black dice. In some way not specified, the archon supervised the final selection, which took place in each tribal allotment chamber. Probably the white dice were in some way equally distributed among the containers in the allotment chambers. Thus five white dice, if five hundred *dikastai* were to be chosen, would be put with, say, fifty-five black dice, and used in each *κληρωτήριο* (if the word is rightly understood) to select from the five *κανονίδες* there placed. If this interpretation is correct, the explanation given on p. 376 seems to be in error as regards the use of the black and white dice.

¹ Cf. *supra*, XXIV (1929), 305-7, and XVII (1922), 370-71, and the *Literary Review*, December 9, 1922, pp. 289-90.

² Cf. *supra*, XXII (1927), 434-35.

³ Cf. *supra*, IX (1914), 98-99.

Mr. Bowra comments on the new fragments of Erinna. He thinks that it is now clear that the correct text of the famous line on old age is *πρᾶνλόγοι πολιαί* not *παυρολόγοι*! He decides that Erinna wrote not her vernacular but an artificially mixed literary dialect.

Mr. Powell supplements the first series with some further additions to our knowledge of Posidippus and other epigrammatists, and quotes and interprets the Marathon inscription in honor of Herodes Atticus.

Mr. R. M. Rattenbury's theme is "Romance: Traces of Lost Greek Novels."

An appendix supplements the chapter on Greek metre in the second series with a discussion of the Cairo musical fragment (*Jour. Hell. Stud.*, 1931).

The volume is indispensable to every university library and every teacher of Greek literature. This notice is merely a *compte rendu*.

PAUL SHOREY

Einleitung in die Altertumswissenschaft. Unter Mitwirkung von J. BELOCH, E. BETHE, E. BICKEL, E. BICKERMANN, H. DESSAU, V. EHRENBURG, J. L. HEIBERG, F. HILLER VON GAERTRINGEN, E. HOFFMANN, B. KEIL, E. KORNEIMANN, P. KRETSCHMER, W. KUNKEL, R. LAQUEUR, P. LEHMANN, C. F. LEHMANN-HAUPT, H. LIETZMANN, P. MAAS, K. J. NEUMANN, M. P. NILSSON, E. PERNICE, M. POHLENZ, K. REGLING, E. REHM, A. RUMPF, W. SCHUBART, E. TÄUBLER, K. VOGEL, J. VOGT, F. VOLLMER, P. WENDLAND, S. WIDE, U. VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF. Herausgegeben von ALFRED GERCKE und EDUARD NORDEN. II. Band. 2. Teil. Wide-Nilsson: *Griechische und Römische Religion*; Rehm-Vogel: *Exakte Wissenschaften*; Gercke-Hoffmann: *Geschichte der Philosophie*. 4. Auflage. B. G. Teubner, 1933.

I am very willing to announce in *Classical Philology* the completion of the second volume of the latest revision of the excellent Gercke-Norden, *Einleitung*, now purchasable both in separate *Hefte* and in two half-volumes at the price of RM. 12 and RM. 15, respectively, and to add that possessors of the earlier edition will have to buy this too if they wish to keep up to date with regard to what Gildersleeve called the mutations and nutations of philology. The first edition was reviewed by a number of pens in this journal (VIII [1913], 104-17), and as our library possesses all the editions, I began my preparation for this notice with a collation of the texts, but was soon checked by the reflection that life is short and that no European editor would dream of taking note of the variations in the successive editions of any American textbook however excellent. So I will confine myself to one or two perhaps

typical observations on the section that interests me most—Gercke's outline of the history of philosophy. In the review of the earlier edition I expressed my satisfaction that he seemed to reject the Platonic *Epistles* in the sentence "Man lese nur den wahrhaft kindlichen Versuch nach, Platons Ideenlehre mit Hilfe der Geometrie und der Grammatik verständlich zu machen, in [Plat.] 7 Briefe 342 f., einem traurigen Zeugnisse des Tiefstandes in der Akademie im 3. Jahrh." This sentence is now discreetly dropped. Again I may be pardoned for finding a confirmation of my skepticism about vigorous and rigorous theories of Platonic chronology by the transformation undergone by another sentence. In the edition of 1910, II, 323, we read, "Dann fand er das Prinzip aller Bewegung in der sich selbst bewegenden Seele (*Phaidros* 245) und setzte schliesslich im *Phaidon* dieses Prinzip des Lebens mit der Idee des Lebens in enge Verbindung." In the 1933 edition, II, Heft 6, 52, this appears in the form (*italics mine*), "Dann fand er in der sich selbst bewegenden Seele das Prinzip aller Bewegung (*Phaidr.* 245), *nicht im Widerspruch, sondern in Übereinstimmung damit dass er schon im Phaidon dieses Prinzip des Lebens mit der Idee des Lebens in enge Verbindung gebracht hatte.*" But I presume that I shall be told that a scholar who does not change his mind is not growing.

PAUL SHOREY

The Treasurers of Athena. By WILLIAM SCOTT FERGUSON. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932. Pp. xiii + 198. \$4.00.

The volume under consideration contains a series of very able epigraphical studies connected primarily with the history of the finances of the Athenian state during the Peloponnesian War. An adequate evaluation of the details of the epigraphical studies can be made only by one of those very few scholars who themselves have made detailed investigations of the group of inscriptions to which those studied belong. The present reviewer is not numbered among the select few and can only say that to him the work appears both brilliant and sound.

The student with a general interest in the study of Greek history and antiquities will approach the book with a mingled feeling of something akin to despair and intoxication. The despair will be due to a realization of the great amount of detailed work needed before he can feel that he fully understands the work that is being done in this field and to the further realization that without such work he can speak only as an outsider about some of the central facts of Greek history. The intoxication will be due to the enthusiasm engendered as he sees how the detailed investigations are made to contribute to the interpretation of broader problems. The student of the period of the Peloponnesian War will rejoice to see additional light thrown upon one event after another. More important, however, is the fact that Professor Ferguson's work supplies a surer foundation for a general interpretation of Athenian state finances. This, in turn, will make the reader aware of the epoch-making

advances in our knowledge of Greek history that are the result of the epigraphical studies of Ferguson himself as well as those of Meritt, Dinsmoor, and West. Some day it may be possible to summarize these results in a single inclusive work. At present that day is relatively remote. Important studies are still appearing with startling frequency. Meanwhile, much help is afforded by Ferguson's fascinating essay, "Athenian War Finance," which appeared in the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* for 1932. It is a pity that this was not printed in some publication more accessible to the average student of classics.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

JAKOB A. O. LARSEN

Die Schulaussprache des Griechischen von der Renaissance bis zur Gegenwart, im Rahmen einer allgemeinen Geschichte des griechischen Unterrichts. By ENGELBERT DRERUP. Zweiter Teil: Vom XVIII. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart. Paderborn, 1932. Pp. viii+562.

The second volume of Professor Drerup's great work treats, with the same thoroughness and attention to detail as the first volume (cf. *Class. Phil.*, XXVI [1931], 99-104), of the development of the pronunciation of Greek from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the present time. We are here told that the advance of Hellenism in the principal countries of Europe and in North America in the course of and following the eighteenth century was effectively checked by the revival of the Erasmian pronunciation, chiefly as the result of the new humanistic movement in Germany in the nineteenth century represented by such eminent scholars as Reiz, Hermann, Wolf, etc, and that its territory was finally restricted to the Netherlands and the English empire where it continues to be used to this day. The numerous attempts on the part of enthusiastic Philhellenes in France, Denmark, and Germany, as well as by overpatriotic modern Greeks, to restore the traditional pronunciation proved entirely abortive because they were, for the most part, actuated by an excessively eager nationalism and lacked a sufficient acquaintance with the progress of the linguistic science of the day. However, it is interesting to observe that the arguments of the adherents of the Reuchlinian pronunciation found no more uncompromising critics than such *enlightened* modern Greek scholars as Psichari and Hatzidakis, whose works, in justice to modern Greek scholarship, should not be left out of this comprehensive study.

In the last chapter, which will be read with interest by the general reader who cannot avail himself of the minute discussion of the earlier chapters, the author sets forth the practical results and conclusions which he draws from the foregoing detailed considerations concerning the main divisions of the subject, namely, the question of the modern Greek, Hellenian and Erasmian pronunciation, and the problem of Greek accentuation, offering, at the same time, certain suggestions, which, if not entirely satisfactory, will be consulted

with profit by those engaged in the solution of the question under examination. Eight full and accurate indexes complete this conscientious and exhaustive study of a very important problem.

P. S. COSTAS

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D. Iunii Iuvenalis Saturae. Editorum in usum edidit A. E. HOUSMAN. Cantabrigiae: Typis Academiae, 1931. Pp. lviii+146. Cloth, 10s. 6d. net.

In the preface to his edition of Juvenal (1905), Housman's apologia contained—among other vigorous and challenging sentences—these: "Since my aim is not so much to produce a good text of Juvenal as to reform Juvenalian criticism and encourage future editors to produce good texts, I have sacrificed truth to worldly wisdom and controversial strategy" (p. xviii); and "This work, as I said before, is not meant for a model; it is an enterprise undertaken in haste and in humane concern for the relief of a people sitting in darkness" (p. xxxvi), a purpose phrased on the title-page, by way of a succinct and, to some (viz., "the unintelligent . . .") who ". . . call themselves sane critics, meaning that they are mechanics" [p. xiii]), a shockingly direct rebuke, "Editorum in Usum."

The conceit of this is justifiable—even the "mechanics" must now admit it—for in the twenty-six years that intervened between Housman's first edition and his reissue of 1931, no other text of like quality has appeared: moreover, such is the futility of excellence, subsequent editors have failed to avail themselves of all the illuminating observations of the Cambridge scholar, and the reformation which he hoped to accomplish has not been general.

The new edition is avowedly a reprint of the earlier publication: preface, text, and apparatus reappear in the same arrangement and similar typography. Changes consisting "much more in additions than in corrections" (p. xxxvii) are set forth in an additional preface (pp. xxxvii-lvii) in the second paragraph of which the editor says that he has "amended a few errors of the press and slips of the pen, chiefly in numerals; modified a few reports from MSS on the authority of recent collators; added one or two testimonia and subtracted a larger number of the less ancient; inserted a few more examples; and that is all."

These corrective items and parallel citations are not incorporated into the text or otherwise indicated by cross-reference (except in the case of a single change, viz., *Sat.* xv. 10) but are listed in the new preface; on pages xlii-xliii matters relating to statements found in the earlier preface of 1905, on pages xlv-liv details, in proper sequence, pertaining to the *apparatus criticus* of the several satires.

Preceding these lists is printed, on pages xxxviii-xlii, a further discussion of double recension, by way of attack on Leo, exponent of that theory (*Her-*

mes, XLIV [1909], 600-617; ed. Weidmann; Berlin, 1910), and a lucid summary of the relation of P to the interpolated manuscripts.

His criticism of Leo is true to form (cf. Angela Thirkell, *London Mercury*, December, 1928, p. 154: "Polished sarcasm and delightfully turned insult were in the genius of the language"—i.e., Latin—"and Professor Housman can show us exactly how it was done in Latin and English."); e.g., of Leo as an emendator, Housman says that "... it was necessary for him . . . to propose a remedy different from mine; and this compulsion may partly explain, though it can hardly excuse, the poor quality of much which he proposed" (p. xxxviii). In two out of nine passages, viii. 122-24 and ix. 118-23, Housman admits that Leo's hypothesis of double recension "will account for the phenomena though it is only one way of accounting for them" (in the first the point of departure is a suggestion of Housman's own, in the second Teuffel's); in a third, vi. 558, "it will not account for them"; in the fourth and fifth, viii. 1 ff. and ix. 3-5, "it so ill accounts for them that he is obliged to help it out by altering the text"—surely not an unfamiliar or unpardonable or unnecessary procedure in editing the classics—and worse, "His theory that there are here [viii. 1 ff.] relics of two recensions is not even new, and was put forward by Paldamus in 1838"! Arguments on vi. 614, ix. 130 f., xi. 165, Housman dismisses with the charge that "he imputes to Juvenal things which we have no right to impute to him."

With regard to viii. 123 ff. and vi. 614-17, Housman reiterates his statement of 1905 that possibly the one and probably the other represents alternatives of Juvenal's authorship.

The Oxford verses do not, in his opinion, have any bearing on the question of double recension. "The explanation . . . [*Class. Rev.*, XV (1901), 265, and *Praef.*, p. xxiv] . . . begun by Paul von Winterfeld and carried to completion by me is absolutely perfect; and if any other explanation is also perfect, that can be no ground for preferring it."

In short, "In no single case is his [Leo's] hypothesis necessary; the phenomena are always explicable otherwise." But, by Housman's own pronouncement of choice, there can be, in at least half of these disputed passages, no reason for preferring their explanation otherwise. If Housman could say of any other one of these what he says of ix. 119 ff., "I have given a better explanation on p. lii," his defiance would be more becoming.

Rebukes administered to various other students of Juvenal include several of a particularly virulent nature directed deservedly at an overzealous and non-discriminating critic, R. Helm, whose failure to read the signs aright led to his submersion in a mire of errors in a single article (review of Housman's first edition, *Woch. f. kl. Phil.*, No. 13 [1907], cols. 342-49). "The poet," says Mr. Housman, "to whom I referred was not Ruperti but Juvenal, who has twelve examples of *quamquam*. . . . Marklands are born for the bewilderment of Helms. . . . If he reads the scholiast, he will learn: at present he has read only the five words which I cited," *et al.*

As to the editor's estimate—in a lesser man one would say partisanship—of Paris 8072 and Burn 192, no decision is possible; consideration of a complete collation of the manuscripts of Juvenal might bear out Housman's reference to Paris 8072 as "a weightier witness than O" at ii. 45 (and not only there but at iv. 8 where as yet no entirely satisfactory reading has been propounded); and it might help banish the natural skepticism of readers on the validity of Burn 192 as preserving "relics of the truth" not found elsewhere, which Mr. Housman does not doubt for, among other virtues, it confirms his conjectures at vii. 22 and xi. 148.

Emendations formerly proposed by Housman stand unchanged in both text and apparatus, many without comment, while for certain others (iii. 217, iv. 128, vi. 158, ix. 134, xiii. 49) support is adduced from similar confusions and like expressions in other authors, once elsewhere in the *Satires*. In three instances, however (vi. 0. 9, x. 313, xvi. 18), although there is no definite retraction of reading or argument—for such would be quite out of character in this editor—there is reason to doubt his own confidence in his earlier judgment. In the first of these, vi. 0. 9 *psellus ab euphono*] *psillus* O, *eupholio* O, *euphono* Housman and Platt, *euhoplio* Leo, Housman admits Leo's defense of *Psyllus* but objects to *Euhoplio* with good reason, though he assails it unnecessarily as "one of those 'paleographical emendations' which are the bane of criticism." His own suggestion, nevertheless, is of the same character, based on the substitution of *li* for *n* and not merely a transfer of *p*; the same principle is employed by Housman at vi. 195 *ferendis*] (fe)relictis *codd.*: palaeographic confusion underlies also his reading at x. 197 *ore* and presumably his alternative explanation of xvi. 18 *sed enim* ("It may be that *sed enim* has fallen out between -*st* and *de mil*-" [1931]) or *inquis* (*uel inquit* [1905] *igitur* Pψ). A note on x. 313 (p. liii) may be construed as tacit admission of a changed opinion with regard to

lex irae] *exire irati* A
exigere irati ψ
irati PT *aliique*

(but no constructive suggestion replaces it): "It is not safe to build a conjecture on a reading peculiar to A, whose peculiar readings are not elsewhere true unless they are very close to P's, the two MSS being derived from a common parent."

The substitution of *gestare* for

dedit hunc Sψ [vi.158]
dedit hoc P flor. Sang., O

is neat but not an improvement; nor is the separation of *incestae* from *sorori* "ridicule"; rather, the relative position of *barbarus incestae* and *Agrippa sorori* affords an effective designation of previous holders of the gem, donor and recipient, of Alexandria and of Rome.

Regarding Lindsay's assertion of the frequency with which *quisquam* is copied incorrectly as *quis*, one item in his refusal to accept Housman's esti-

mate of the fifteenth-century MS Burn 192 at xi. 148 (*qui steterit* Housman, *quis erit* et Burn 192, *quisquam erit* et ALOT, *quisquam erit* in PSFGU), Housman's retort is in order. If the mistake were common, one should be able to find repeated examples in printed collations and in codices of one's own examination. No instance has, to my knowledge, been reported. Perhaps in Mr. Lindsay's revision of *Notae Latinae* this deficiency will be remedied; but the validity of any reading here is not dependent upon this point. Leo's emendation *quisquam erit: id magnum* Housman rejects with the scathing remark that it "had indeed the disadvantage of being a more violent alteration"—which it is not—"but the countervailing merit of not being mine."

A few errors in typesetting mar an otherwise remarkably accurate printing: from line 15 on page xv of the preface a mark of final punctuation is omitted; in line 1 on page xliii the name "S. A. Loew" should read "E. A. Loew"; in line 1 on page lv the Ratti fragment is wrongly reported as reading *Archigenem*, whereas it shows *Archigenen*, and was so recorded by Housman in *Classical Review*, XXIV (1910), 161b; on page 37 in the critical apparatus at vi. 34, 35 *pungio* PSψ should be corrected to *pungio* PSΣ as in Housman's first edition. Another discrepancy in the apparatus of the two editions arouses a suspicion of misprint on page 49, but in the absence of first-hand information as to the reading of U, I hesitate to condemn it as such, viz., vi. 365 *reputant* P Brit. 15 B xii, *ruputant* U, *repetunt* ψ, while the edition of 1905 ascribes to U the form *reputunt*. On page 106 a note in the apparatus at xi. 148 "de corruptela dixi p. xxxviii praefationis ad Manili lib. I" should refer instead to pages xxxvi-xxxvii.

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The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. IX: *The Roman Republic, 133-44 B.C.* Edited by S. A. COOK, Litt.D.; F. E. ADCOCK, M.A.; and M. P. CHARLESWORTH, M.A. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1932. Pp. xxxi+1022 and maps, plans, and tables. \$9.00.

As a whole the present volume, in actual execution of the tasks undertaken, lives up to the high standards of the *Cambridge Ancient History*. In some respects, however, there is a marked contrast between it and Volume VIII. In the latter volume there were many important contributions from scholars that already were widely known for their work in connection with the fields treated by them. In the present volume it is true that Rostovtzeff, Tarn, Bevan, and Mrs. Strong belong to this class. It is also true that Ormerod is known for his work on piracy and that Cary and Adcock, though best known for their work on Greek history, have also made contributions to Roman history. Nevertheless, the volume to some extent gives the impression that it is largely the

result of a task conscientiously performed rather than a statement of conclusions submitted by experts. Approximately 280 pages, almost one-third of the 881 pages of text, are by Last. They contain an account of Roman politics for fully three-fourths of the period covered by the volume. The bibliography for this section, though an unsatisfactory arrangement makes it difficult to check, does not seem to contain a single study by him. It is true that he discusses controversial topics in the text, and that he has a few notes at the end of the volume. It is further true that Last is an Oxford fellow and lecturer, that the subjects he discusses are regularly submitted to detailed consideration by Oxford teachers and students, and that thus a prominent member of this group has a real claim to a hearing. Yet it is hard to understand how any historian can cover so complicated a period at such length without finding it necessary to publish preliminary studies.

Another contrast between the two volumes is found in the general impression left by the contents. Volume VIII leaves the impression of a complex world containing many different forces and elements. In Volume IX the whole world seems oppressed, repressed, and colored by Roman politics. The statement on page 1, "The tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus inaugurates a period which finds its theme in the domestic history of the city," can be taken almost as a motto. To some extent this impression is unavoidable. In few periods are the politics of one group or one state of such far-reaching importance. Yet there were people that lived and moved and had their being in the period both inside and outside of Roman territory. Something more is needed on social conditions than a chapter on Ciceronian society; something more on the East than chapters on Pontus, the Jews, and Parthia; something more on the West than a chapter on Gaul; and certainly something more on economic development than incidental notices in connection with the political history. The fact that a generation or two may pass before another work of the same magnitude is undertaken imposes a real obligation. The reader has a right to expect on a larger scale the breadth of outlook that is found, for instance, in Piganiol's *La conquête romaine*. To those that approach the old conventional problems of the history of the period in the old conventional way, the volume will serve as an excellent and sound guide. It has failed to supply as much inspiration as might be desired for those that wish to strike out in a new direction on new lines of investigation.

On the technical side, it can be said that the printing, the proofreading, and the like are up to the usual high standards of the series. On this side the work is so nearly perfect that it is almost a relief to find an occasional slip such as the reference on page 526 to "L. Calpurnius Piso the father-in-law of Caesar's last wife." The maps are numerous and useful. On the other hand, some of the bibliographies are not entirely satisfactory. In the case of the bibliography that accompanies Last's contributions, it is a disadvantage that all the sources for the entire period are grouped in one single bibliography. In the case of inscriptions, coins, and legal documents, little more is done than to cite a few

standard collections without giving any further information. To be sure, these deficiencies are somewhat atoned for by fairly numerous citations in footnotes. The references to modern works are conveniently arranged under various headings, but it is a drawback that under each heading they are cited "in the order in which they become relevant to the texts of the chapters concerned" instead of being arranged alphabetically according to the name of the author. Unfortunately a similar rule is followed also in the citation of modern works in the bibliography for chapters xv-xvii. A few omissions may be noted. As long as the General Bibliography includes one-volume histories of Rome, why is Boak omitted? It is difficult to see why Bouché-Leclercq's *Manuel des institutions romaines* is not cited on page 910. Other omissions are Debevoise's "Parthian Problems" in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, Volume XLVII (1931), and MacFayden's "The Rise of the Princeps' Jurisdiction within the City of Rome" in the *Washington University Studies*, Volume X (1923), "Humanistic Series," No. 2. The latter interesting and readable study contains enough on the republican development to deserve to be cited in the bibliography for chapter xxi.

Space will not permit a detailed consideration of the views expressed by the various contributors. One of the most interesting and challenging sections is the three chapters in which Adcock describes the history of the period from the Conference of Luca to the death of Caesar. In conclusion, let it be said that, in spite of the criticisms he has made, the reviewer believes that the volume is an able, usable, and useful contribution.

JAKOB A. O. LARSEN

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Horazens Epistel über die Dichtkunst. Erklärt von OTTO IMMISCH.
 "Philologus," Supplementband XXIV, Heft 3. Leipzig: Dietrich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1932. Pp. 217.

Minute scholarship perhaps makes more of a mystery of Horace's *Ars poetica* than is necessary. Any intelligent reader will perceive that it is what Horace would call a *sermo* rather than an absolute poem, strictly speaking, or a formal treatise. It is a succession of paragraphs following loosely, it may be, the traditional topical order of an Alexandrian Greek poetics, but selecting at will the points to be developed and disguising gaps by such verbal or gliding transitions as we use in conversation. The substance is supplied by Horace's own reflections on classical Greek and Hellenistic theory from Plato and Aristotle to his own day. As in Cicero's philosophical and rhetorical works, with which he was obviously acquainted, there are Roman illustrations of Greek ideas. The strict unity of some paragraphs is interrupted by digressions and parentheses, the suggestion of which we can only divine; and there are doubtless some allusions to contemporary literary tendencies and controversies which we may not fully appreciate. That is enough for the non-professional cultured reader of the classics, if any such survive, who is perhaps rightly

more interested in the influence of the *Ars poetica* on the extant literature of modern Europe than in its sources in the lost literature of Alexandria or Pergamon.

Professor Immisch's book divides into thirty-two pages of introduction and 185 pages of commentary on the 476 lines of Horace's text. In spite of all that has been written on the subject, he feels that there is still room for a study that takes account of the "discovery" of Neoptolemus by Jensen.¹ He especially wishes to bring out the specific Roman elements and Horace's comparative freedom in following his Greek sources. The Introduction argues learnedly for the date of 20/19 before the death of Virgil (21. Sept. 19). It seems to have escaped Professor Immisch's notice that much of his argument is anticipated by H. Nettleship in the (English) *Journal of Philology*, XII (1883), 43-61. Nettleship also dwells on the specific Roman quality of Horace's application of Neoptolemus' ideas and fixes the date between 24 and 20, interpreting *nil scribens* (306) with Immisch as referring to the *intervallum lyricum* after the publication of the first three books of the *Odes*. Nettleship also analyzes the poem into its successive topics and places the main division about line 291. But he does not think that Horace is over precise in such matters. He does not, like Immisch, discuss at length the difference between *ποίησις* and *ποίημα* or distinguish in the interests of a theory *ὑπόθεσις*, *ἔλη* and *μῦθος*. He does not anticipate and perhaps would have viewed with skepticism Immisch's *Ergebnis für Horaz*, page 20:

- I. 1. Das Dichten [ἡ ποίησις]: 1-152
2. Die Dichtwerke [τὰ ποιήματα]: 153-294
- II. Der Dichter [ὁ ποιητής]: 295-476

It is impossible to summarize or criticize in detail here the rich, discursive, ingenious, perhaps sometimes overingenious commentary. Professor Immisch wishes to understand the inmost significance of everything that Horace says and finds significance in everything. For example, the line "Inceptis gravibus plerumque et magna professis" is, he thinks, an illogical interruption of the professed theme of literary unity, and can be explained only as the intrusion of the alien idea of grandeur from ps. Longinus' "Gedankenwelt." Perhaps. It will be for future interpreters of the *Ars* to weigh this and the scores of hypotheses in which this suggestive commentary abounds.

PAUL SHOREY

Philon von Alexandria als sozialer Denker. VON FRANZ GEIGER.
 "Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft," Vierzehntes Heft.
 Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1932. Pp. 118.

Many critics have perceived that Philo is a very intelligent person and that, despite the deliberate absurdity of his method of reading everything into the Old Testament by allegory, his substantive thought contains a body of sensi-

¹ "Berlin Akad." (1918), No. 14, and 1923, on *Philodemus über die Gedichte*, Buch V.

ble doctrine which admits of systematic presentation. The sober, well-documented exposition of Zeller's eighty-three pages is still adequate for most purposes. But productive scholarship cannot be expected to stop with Zeller, and monographs on Philo will continue to appear.

Dr. Geiger claims that his is the first to treat specifically of Philo's social thinking. That is true with the qualification that what he calls "social philosophy" is little more than Philo's ethics with a few backward references to his fundamental metaphysical and religious opinions and many forward references to actual or presumptive social and political applications of ethical principles and sentiments.

The points to be chiefly noted are Philo's humanitarian and cosmopolitan sense of human brotherhood, his perhaps Jewish emphasis on charity and the relief of poverty, his approval of pity not only as a motive but as an emotion. These and similar traits are well brought out by Dr. Geiger, amply illustrated and plausibly associated with Philo's fundamental philosophy, his race, his reading, and the conditions of the age in which he lived.

There is a considerable introductory bibliography, which is discussed in the text and repeated in the footnotes. American work is, as too often happens, overlooked, and in this case the oversight leads to fundamental error. Dr. Geiger is even more determined than Zeller to represent Philo as a Stoic. Philo's Stoicism is the starting-point and supplies the framework of his entire treatment of Philo's opinions. The perfunctory recognition of a few of Philo's unmistakable references to Plato is usually accompanied by the conjecture that they are derived from Posidonius or some representative of "Middle Platonism." I will leave the exploding of the Posidonius myth to the competent hands of Professor Roger Jones. But if Dr. Geiger had read the Chicago dissertation of Dr. Thomas Henry Billings on the Platonism of Philo Judaeus, he could hardly have failed to give some consideration to the thesis that Philo is not a Stoic but a Platonist. The Platonism of Philo, in fact, stares in the face every reader who is familiar with Plato. His language is simply drenched in Platonic reminiscences, and on most vital questions in which the Stoics diverge from Plato he follows Plato. The ethics of Stoicism, so far as adopted by Philo, is, as Leibniz perceived long ago, little more than a less flexible, less literary, restatement of things more finely, more delicately, more subtly expressed by Plato. The paradoxes of the Stoics, said Cicero, are mostly Socratic. Dr. Billings' dissertation is not exhaustive, for the evidence of Philo's Platonism pervades his entire writings. But Dr. Billings gives enough to entitle his thesis to serious consideration. Any treatment of Philo that recognizes only the Stoic influence in his writings is uncritical. The occasional employment of Stoic terminology proves nothing. Stoicism was the fashionable philosophy of the time. A writer of today is not to be classed as a Freudian because of a few allusions to complexes, repressions, and defense reactions. He can speak of conditioned reflexes without being a behaviorist; and

references to the instability of the homogeneous, the adaptability of internal to external conditions, and the instrumentality of intelligence do not make him a disciple of Herbert Spencer.

In thus emphasizing my dissent, I have perhaps done injustice to the solid merits of Dr. Geiger's industry. His detailed study of such topics as the family, the position of women, friendship, freedom, slavery, freedom of speech, nobility, work, the part of the *logos* and *tyche* in human destiny, *τῦφος* and *ἀλαζονεία*, the ideal of the wise man and the pious man, and similar common-places of ancient and Philonic ethics, retains its value apart from all difference of opinion about Philo's sources. Especially interesting are the concluding reflections on "Philon und das Judenthum," starting from the text of Paul Krüger that Philo is (like Arthur Hugh Clough, though in a different sense) a Dipsychus, who thought as a Greek but felt as a Jew.

PAUL SHOREY

Die Phronesis in der Philosophie Platons vor dem Staate. By JOHANNES HIRSCHBERGER. Philologu, Supplementband XXV, Heft I. Leipzig, 1932. Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Pp. 200. Geheftet M. 12.80; gebunden M. 14.50.

We need not yield again to the temptation to speak ironically or cynically of the ceaseless flood of Platonic literature. It may quite as well be taken as renewed testimony to the fact that the interest in Plato is perennial, not to say persecular, and will survive all modernistic assaults on humanism. My first impression on opening this book was that the meaning of *Phronesis* in Plato's earlier writings did not require an exposition of two hundred pages. But, after all, it is irrelevant to cavil at the title under which Dr. Hirschberger has chosen to expound his interpretation of Plato's philosophy. And in his opinion the problem, What is wisdom? is central for Plato's thought.

The interpretations with which he supports his thesis are in the main, I think, sound. He seems to aim at a judicious compromise between the extremists who attempt a scientific elimination of both chronology and drama in Plato by quoting all passages as equipollent and striking an average, and those who see a development, a change, or a self-contradiction in every variation of phrase. He also tries to hold the balance even between the view that Plato himself was confused by the Socratic analogy between the virtues and the arts and the fancy that the minor dialogues are intended as a covert criticism of Socrates. My own view has always been that Plato to the end reaffirmed the Socratic paradoxes from "piety" or for other reasons, but characteristically reserved the right to interpret them.¹

I cannot here enter into further detail on these and the many points about which I should be inclined to agree with Dr. Hirschberger and a few where I

¹ Cf. *Unity of Plato's Thought*, p. 9.

would dissent. He argues temperately and courteously, and in the maintenance of his own opinions exhibits an intimate familiarity with the Platonic texts and an acquaintance with nearly all the recent literature which he cites frequently and aptly in his 925 footnotes. His book will be of convenient reference for this bibliography and for its discussions of the meaning of many Platonic words.

PAUL SHOREY

BREVIORA

[The managing editor establishes this subdepartment because of the difficulty of procuring substantial critical reviews of all books, and the impossibility if they were found of printing them in our limited space. It is believed that brief but fair *comptes rendus* will prove more useful than a mere biographical notice. Contributions to this department should never exceed a page, and a paragraph is preferable.]

Aristotle: "The Politics." With an English translation by H. RACKHAM, M.A. Loeb Classical Library. London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1932. \$2.50.

There are, or ought to be, many readers of Aristotle's *Politics*, and after the elegant freedom of Jowett there is still place for a closer version in the "Loeb Series." The general reader will get the substance of Aristotle well enough from either. But the student who tries to work with translations can escape their pitfalls only by using more than one. Otherwise he will be misled by the associations of the English synonyms which his translator selects. A captious reviewer can always cavil on the synonyms preferred by any translator and can always find passages which he would have turned differently. It is enough to say here that Mr. Rackham's rendering is, so far as tested, correct and well written. The plan of the "Loeb Series" does not call for copious annotation and there was no room for it here if the entire *Politics* was to be contained in a single volume. I merely observe then that the exegetical notes are confined to the indispensable minimum and that there is no attempt to exhibit the indebtedness of Aristotle to Plato on nearly every page. To give only one of scores of available examples, on page 1255 *a* Aristotle is undoubtedly thinking of the controversy with Callicles in the *Gorgias*, and his language is colored and its meaning to some extent affected by that reminiscence.

PAUL SHOREY

Leandro Zancan: Sul Possesso dell' "Ager Publicus." Estratto dagli Atti della Reale Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Vol. LXVII. Torino: Vincenzo Bona, 1932. Pp. 28.

In a closely reasoned legal argument Zancan undertakes to show that the Roman *ager publicus* was held by individuals under a *publica concessio*; that the *privata possessio* thus granted was recognized by the *ius civile* and pro-

tected by the praetorian interdict; that such property was rated by the censors and was in fact the foundation of most senatorial fortunes (cf. the non-technical use of *possessionses* in the sense of *patrimonium*); and that the law of 111 B.C. which granted quiritarian ownership of land thus held was a reaffirmation of earlier legislation, presumably that of the Gracchi.

I am admittedly incompetent to discuss this question on legal grounds, but much of Zancan's evidence comes from Cicero. I question the validity of using statements in political speeches like those *de lege agraria*, and even the validity of using passages in works like the *De officiis*, in which too often Cicero forgot that he was not composing a political document. Romans of the political and economic views which Cicero represents under those conditions could no doubt find much comfort in Zancan's argument, but I should wish to find it accepted by Cicero before 63 B.C., or by Caesar later, to be convinced. One's legal interpretation of the question was in Rome determined mainly by non-legal considerations.

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Die Römische Taktik zu Beginn der Kaiserzeit und die Geschichtschreibung (Philologus, Supplementband XXIII, Heft II). Von FRIEDRICH LAMMERT. Leipzig: Dieterich, 1931. Pp. viii+64. Paper, M. 4.50.

If there is perhaps less of comment, at least explicit comment, on historical composition than on tactics in this book, that fact may be attributed to the author's preoccupation with military history (he is the author of numerous significant articles in this field in Pauly-Wissowa). The author's distribution of emphasis is gratefully received when we realize the fulness of his discussion. New tactics, new equipment, new means of employing cavalry and of withstanding cavalry, new march- and battle-formations, are described and amply documented, from the historians themselves and from writers on tactics. Acquaintance with tactics is not without significance: "Die Kenntniss der Taktiker in diesen eigentümlichen Mischformen macht manche böse Stelle der Schriftsteller erst recht verständlich" (p. 42).

The passages on which most light is thrown are Plutarch's account of Carrhae and the sixth chapter of Tacitus' *Germania*. There is also a valuable discussion of the lost *de iaculatione equestri* of the elder Pliny. I must agree with the author when he says: "Eine Vorstellung von dem Neuartigen in der römischen Taktik in den Jahrhunderten um Christi Geburt zu geben, ist die Aufgabe der vorliegenden Schrift. Dabei ergibt sich Gewinn für die Erklärung der Schriftsteller" (p. vii).

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Perioden der Klassischen Philologie. Grondslagen eener Geschiedenis van het Humanisme. Door ENGELBERT DRERUP. Nijmegen-Utrecht: Dekker, Van de Vegt & Van Leeuwen, 1930. Pp. 48. Paper, Fl. 1.

Gudeman, Peck, Sandys, Wilamowitz, and many more have devoted volumes to the history of classical scholarship, and each one has left many gaps. It requires both courage and knowledge to undertake to present even a sketch of the subject within the limits of a "Rectorale Rede." Dr. Drerup has both. He has assimilated his material with astonishing success, and he has given us clear and satisfying characterizations of the changing currents of scholarship. He has included a surprising number of names, with brief comments (the latest is that of Eduard Meyer), but curiously finds no occasion to mention Drumann with Niebuhr and Mommsen. His address is more than a mere catalogue: it is a record of the progress of humanism to the present moment when international scholarship is one of the reasons why we may hope for a better world in the future. Naturally and properly, Dr. Drerup's eyes are fixed on his own country and his own countrymen, but he has resisted any temptation to exaggerate their great achievements, and his wish for all mankind is for "een edeler, een rijker, een schooner leven," to be gained through humanistic studies.

Bibliographical notes are added but are unpretentious. There is no index.

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Varro und die Hellenistische Sprachtheorie. Problemata: Forschungen zur klassischen Philologie. Von HELLFRIED DAHLMANN. Berlin: Weidmann, 1932. Pp. 89. Paper, M. 6.

This investigation deserves a more competent review. Dahlmann's purpose is to examine the structure of Varro's *De lingua Latina*, its sources, and the personal contribution of Varro. Books V-VII, dealing with etymology, treat the subject from the standpoint of a grammarian and not of a philosopher, though the material is mainly of Stoic origin and the disposition of the material also Stoic. Varro's own contribution is especially his use of old Latin words, and he thus testifies to his interest in *Latinitas*. Aelius Stilo is a possible source, but Cicero gives evidence of Varro's independent scholarship (*Brut.* 205). Books VIII-X deal with the problem of analogy versus anomaly. Varro presents both sides. He first presents the attack on the analogy of Aristarchus: the ultimate source is Crates of Mallos, drawn from some Latin re-working of his argument. The final defense of analogy is that of Varro himself. There is a brief but apparently sufficient Index.

The brevity of this review prevents a more complete account of this book.

There is a certain amount of repetition, but the agreeable picture of Varro stands out clearly. One wishes that the scope of the work had allowed fuller conjecture regarding the possible Latin intermediaries and the grammatical activities of the Scipionic circle and its offspring, and one hopes for much more from Dahlmann.

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The Ephemerides of Alexander's Expedition. By CHARLES ALEXANDER ROBINSON, JR. ("Brown University Studies.") Providence: Brown University, 1932. Pp. 81. \$3.00.

The present volume supplies students of Alexander with a valuable tool. A large part of the work is taken up by a tabular summary of the information of the sources concerning the itinerary of Alexander. A similar table compares the versions of the extant fragments of the *Ephemerides* as they appear in quotations in various authors. The study of the itinerary shows three distinct divisions. In the first and third there is fair agreement; in the second division there is disagreement between the extant accounts. It is suggested that the original *Ephemerides* were destroyed by fire in India with the papers of Eumenes. Those for the first division, however, had been drawn upon already by Callisthenes and thus much of their material was preserved. This was not the case with the second division. For the third division again the *Ephemerides* were available. An Appendix contains an important chronological study of Alexander's march from Persepolis to the Hindu Kush. The author hopes to supply an "Alexander harmony" soon. This will be awaited with interest.

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